# LECTURE NOTES ON DISCRETE TIME FINANCE FALL 2020

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Note: The page numbers and links will not be correct in the annotated version.

Black-Scholes Formula

#### 1. Preface.

These are the slides I used while teaching this course in 2020. I projected them (spaced out) in class, and filled in the proofs by writing over them with a tablet. Both the annotated version of these slides with handwritten proofs, and the compactified un-annotated version can be found on the class website. The LATEX source of these slides is also available on git.

#### 2. Syllabus Overview

- Class website and full syllabus: http://www.math.cmu.edu/~gautam/sj/teaching/2020-21/370-dtime-finance
- TA's: Jonghwa Park < jonghwap@andrew.cmu.edu>, Karl Xiao < kzx@andrew.cmu.edu>, Hongyi Zhou < hongyizh@andrew.cmu.edu>
- Homework Due: Every Wednesday, before class (on Gradescope)

If I get disconnected, check your email for instructions.

Midterms: Wed Sep 29, 5th week, and Wed Nov 3rd, 10th week (self proctored, can be taken any time)

#### • Zoom lectures:

- ▶ Please enable video. (It helps me pace lectures).
- ▶ Mute your mic when you're not speaking. Use headphones if possible. Consent to be recorded.

#### Homework:

- Sood quality scans please! Use a scanning app, and not simply take photos. (I use Adobe Scan.) ≥ 20% penalty if turned in within an hour of the deadline. 100% penalty after that.
- Two homework assignments can be turned in 24h late without penalty.
- Bottom 2 homework scores are dropped from your grade (personal emergencies, other deadlines, etc.).
- Collaboration is encouraged. Homework is not a test ensure you learn from doing the homework.
- You must write solutions independently, and can only turn in solutions you fully understand.

#### Exams:

- Can be taken at any time on the exam day. Open book. Use of internet allowed.
- Collaboration is forbidden. You may not seek or receive assistance from other people. (Can search forums; but may not post.)
- Self proctored: Zoom call. Record yourself, and your screen to the cloud.
- Share the recording link; also download a copy and upload it to the designated location immediately after turning in your exam.

#### • Academic Integrity

| Zero tolerance for violations (automatic R).

∀iolations include:

- Not writing up solutions independently and/or plagiarizing solutions

- Turning in solutions you do not understand.

- Seeking, receiving or providing assistance during an exam.


- Discussing the exam on the exam day (24h). Even if you have finished the exam, others may be taking it.

▶ All violations will be reported to the university, and they may impose additional penalties.

# • Grading: 30% homework, 20% each midterm, 30% final.

# 3. Replication, and Arbitrage Free Pricing

- Start with a *financial market* consisting of traded assets (stocks, bonds, money market, options, etc.)
- We model the price of these assets through random variables (stochastic processes).
- No Arbitrage Assumption:
  - ▶ In order to make money, you have to take risk. (Can't make something out of nothing.)
  - $\triangleright$  There doesn't exist a trading strategy with  $X_0 = 0$ ,  $X_n \ge 0$  and  $P(X_n > 0) > 0$ .
- Now consider a non-traded asset Y (e.g. an option). How do you price it?
  Arbitrage free price: V<sub>0</sub> is the arbitrage free price of Y, if given the opportunity to trade Y at price V<sub>0</sub>, the market remains



• How do you compute the arbitrage free price? Replication:  $\triangleright$  Say the non-traded asset pays  $V_N$  at time N (e.g. call options).  $\triangleright$  Say you can replicate the payoff through a trading strategy  $X_0, \ldots, X_N = V_N$  (using only traded assets). Then the arbitrage free price is uniquely determined, and must be  $X_0$ . Question 3.1. Is the arbitrage free price always unique? Eg: Sn -> price of true n Bank - infut vate r. Monte & Stock + Banks. NTA: Call after page (SN-K) Say traph some say of trade we have

Nothing Strategy wealth Xo, Xo, ... XN = (So-K) (Raphicaling strat)

Why is AFP of the nan tradle next Xo (instal walk of the Reason: V = AFP of the Replicating short earn).

X = inst neath of Rep study y. Say to A Vo. Then Borrow to \$2 long the Hody start.

At the O, have (No-Xo) \$. > Put in bank.

At time N >> wealth = { NN From thooling ctual NTA (No No) (1+12) } Embeds Sometimes of the North No. From froding Anat

Weath at the  $N = (1 - X_0)(1 + \alpha N) > 0$ .

antituge

<b>Theorem 3.2.</b> The arbitrage free price is unique exactly the initial capital of the replicating street		strategy! In this cas	e, the arbitrage free price is
<i>Proof.</i> We already proved that if a replicating and will be done later.	strategy exists then the arbitrage fre	e price is unique. Tl	ne other direction is harder $\Box$
Question 3.3. If a replicating strategy exists,	must it be unique?	Morre on	his lata.
		v vc	•
	initial wealth of the	redicati e	Stulegry
Has	to be unique	· ·	V
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OHW I is online. (2) Hint on 82(6) is on the dission bod hat true: No ant : To wake \$ you need to take visk. (a) If  $X_0 = 0$ , know  $X_n \ge 0$  then met have  $X_n = 0$  (a) and  $X_n = 0$ AFP: (Si) AFP: Given the affatuty to trade the ment assit at farrer to, the Market (and five)

Market (and five)

**Question 3.4.** Consider a financial market with a money market account with interest rate  $\underline{r}$ , and a stock. Let K > 0. A forward contract requires the holder to buy the stock at price K at maturity time N. What is the arbitrage free price at time 0? Payaff & hot Sni = stak page at true M. at waterly forward control pays SN-K To compute AFP > Repliate it.

Voo only tradable assets, Stat wike \$\sqrt{0}\$. Stategy & O Bry the stock (costs So \$) (worth S, \$ at time i)

$$X_{N} = N$$
 earlier at time  $N = S_{N} - K = payors of F. C.

$$\Rightarrow AFP \text{ of the formal constant, is } S_{0} - \frac{K}{(4\pi)^{N}}$$$ 

# 4. Binomial model (one period)

Say we have access to a money market account with interest rate r. The binomial model dictates that the stock price varies as follows. Let  $p \in (0,1)$ , q = 1 - p, 0 < d < u (up and down factors). Flip a coin that lands heads with probability p, and tails with probability q. When the coin lands heads, the stock price changes by the factor u, and when it lands tails it changes by the factor p.

Question 4.1. When is there arbitrage in this market?

Also Need to check there is no out if 
$$d < 1+r < h$$
.

Stat with  $X = 0$   $S$  Ao shape of stack.

Neath at time  $0 = A_0S_0 + (-A_0S_0) = 0$ .

Neath at time  $1 = A_0S_1 - A_0S_0(1+rr)$ 

$$= A_0(S_1 - (1+rr)S_0) = S_0(u - (1+rr))S_0 = S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0 = S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0 = S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0(d - (1+rr))S_0$$

Question 4.2. If a security pays  $\underline{\underline{V_1}}$  at time  $\underline{\underline{1}}$ , what is the arbitrage free price at time  $\underline{0}$ . ( $V_1$  can depend on whether the coin flip is heads or tails).

Find AFP by nephoton.

Start with X \$.

Shows af stark (costs 450).

et time 0.

 $X_1 = \text{wealth}$  at true  $I = 40 S_1 + (x_0 - 40 S_0)(1+x)$  Went  $Y_1$ 

 $X_1 = \Delta_0 \left( S_1 - (1+r) S_0 \right) + X_0 (1+r) \qquad \frac{W_{\text{out}}}{=} V_1.$ 

To this possible of lam choose to & X L) Yes! (2 eg, 2 unknowns) -> 40 2 % Will salve met tru 2 find Do, No. ENABLE VIDED IF YOU CAN

( & even of your count )

# 4. Binomial model (one period)

Say we have access to a money market account with interest rate r) The binomial model dictates that the stock price varies as follows. Let  $p \in (0,1)$ , q=1-p, 0 < d < u (up and down factors). Flip a coin that lands heads with probability p, and tails with probability q. When the coin lands heads, the stock price changes by the factor u, and when it lands tails it changes by the factor d.

Question 4.1. When is there arbitrage in this market?

Question 4.2. If a security pays  $V_1$  at time 1, what is the arbitrage free price at time 0.  $(V_1 \text{ can depend on whether the coin flip is})$ Say Biron model NO ort ( Ned < 174 < 4)

Reflecte V, Stat with X wealth S X - 40 So cash. head: Find X & D & wealth at time I = V, (payalf of sec).

 $= \Delta_0 \left( S_1 - (14n) S_0 \right) + (14n) X_0 \stackrel{\text{Wat}}{=} V_1$ 

$$\frac{1}{100} = \frac{1}{100} = \frac{1}$$

$$(3) f @ + \gamma (b) \Rightarrow (1+r) \chi_0 = \int_0^r V_1(H) + \gamma^r V_1(T)$$

$$= \int_0^r \chi_0(H) + \gamma^r V_1(T)$$

$$= \int_0^r V_1(H) + \gamma^r V_1(T)$$

$$= \int_0^r V_1(H) + \gamma^r V_1(T)$$

(4) find 
$$\Delta_0$$
 is Take  $(R-b)$ .

$$\Rightarrow \Delta_0 (u-d)S_0 = V_1(H) - V_1(T)$$

$$(n-d)S_0$$
(5)  $fu+fid = 1+r$  (2)  $fu+(1-fi)d = 1+r$ 

$$(\Rightarrow f(u-d) = 1+r-d \Rightarrow f= \frac{1+r-d}{u-d}$$

Experted return of stock at time  $1 = \frac{7}{7}S_1(H) + \frac{7}{9}S_1(T)$  $= (1+r) S_0$ = Same veturn ar futing money in bank. Note AFP = X = \( \frac{7}{V\_1(t)} + \frac{7}{V\_1(t)} = \) \( \frac{1}{1+T} \) \( \frac{1}{2} \) \( \f Question 4.3. What's an N period version of this model? Do we have the same formulae? (# heads) (# tails) u - eid coin libs. had: Avalyse the a finial case troughly. 1) Securities that don't expine at a fixed time. (period 1) (pinel 2 (2) American options.

5. A quick introduction to probability 
$$325$$
 on  $325$  on  $325$  Definition 5.1. The sample space is the set  $\Omega = \{(\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \mid \text{ each } \omega_i \text{ represents the outcome of a coin toss (or die roll).}  $\Omega$$ 

**Definition 5.1.** The sample space is the set  $\Omega = \{(\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \mid \text{ each } \omega_i \text{ represents the outcome of a coin toss (or die roll).}\}$  $\triangleright$  E.g.  $\omega_i \in \{H, T\}$ , or  $\omega_i \in \{\pm 1\}$ .  $\triangleright$  Coins / dice don't have to be identical: Pick  $M_1, M_2, \ldots, \in \mathbb{N}$ , and can require  $\omega_i \in \{1, \ldots, M_i\}$ .

▶ Usually in probability the sample space is simply a set; however, for our purposes it is more convenient to consider "coin toss spaces" as we defined above. **Definition 5.2.** A sample point is a point  $\omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \in \Omega$ 

# **Definition 5.3.** A probability mass function is a function $p: \Omega \to [0,1]$ such that $\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} p(\omega) = 1$ . **Definition 5.4.** An event is a subset of $\overline{\Omega}$ . Define $P(A) = \sum_{\omega \in A} p(\omega)$ .

have  $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2, -\omega_0)$ 

$$(\varphi(\omega) = \varphi rab \ af \ z\omega \} \ occurring)$$

$$A \subset SL \ some emit$$

$$P(A) = \varphi rab \ A \ occurs = \sum_{\omega \in A} \varphi(\omega)$$

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### 5. A quick introduction to probability

This is just a quick reminder, and specific to our situation (coin toss spaces). You should have already taken a probability course, or be co-enrolled in one. The only thing we will cover in any detail is conditional expectation.

Let  $N \in \mathbb{N}$  be large (typically the maturity time of financial securities).

**Definition 5.1.** The sample space is the set  $\Omega = \{(\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \mid \text{each } \omega_i \text{ represents the outcome of a coin toss (or die roll).}\}$ 

- $\triangleright$  E.g.  $\omega_i \in \{H, T\}$ , or  $\omega_i \in \{\pm 1\}$ .
- $\triangleright$  Coins / dice don't have to be identical: Pick  $M_1, M_2, \ldots, \in \mathbb{N}$ , and can require  $\omega_i \in \{1, \ldots, M_i\}$ .
- ▶ Usually in probability the *sample space* is simply a set; however, for our purposes it is more convenient to consider "coin toss spaces" as we defined above.
- **Definition 5.2.** A sample point is a point  $\omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \in \Omega \in \Omega$ . **Definition 5.3.** A probability mass function is a function  $p: \Omega \to [0,1]$  such that  $\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} p(\omega) = 1$ .
- **Definition 5.4.** An event is a subset of  $\Omega$ . Define  $P(\underline{A}) = \sum_{\omega \in A} p(\omega)$ .

Viendize S2 for coin fosses: {\fig2} or \{\text{H}, \text{Te}\}.

N (iid) coins \w\_{\gamma} \in \{\text{V}', 2\} \text{V'} \in \{\text{I}}, \text{--} \N\{\text{V}} indeprolit, identically distributed Son N = 3.  $\omega \in \Omega$ .  $\omega = (1, 2, 1)$ 

# 5.1. Random Variables and Independence.

**Definition 5.5.** A random variable is a function  $X: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$ .

Question 5.6. What is the random variable corresponding to the outcome of the n<sup>th</sup> coin toss?

$$\Omega = \{ \omega = (\omega_1, -\omega_2) \mid \omega_1 \in \{1, 2\} \}$$

$$X_{N}(\omega) = \mathbb{R}V$$
 corresponding to the nth coint foss.

$$= \omega_{N} \qquad \left( \omega_{N} \otimes \omega_{N} \otimes \omega_{N} \otimes \omega_{N} \otimes \omega_{N} \right)$$

**Definition 5.7.** The expectation of a random variable 
$$X$$
 is  $EX = \sum X(\omega)p(\omega)$ .

Remark 5.8. Note if Range $(X) = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ , then  $EX = \sum X(\omega)p(\omega) = \sum_{1}^{n} x_i P(X = x_i)$ .

**Definition 5.9.** The variance of a random variable is  $Var(X) = E(X - EX)^2$ .

Remark 5.10. Note  $Var(X) = EX^2 - (EX)^2$ .

Notation convolue 
$$EX^2$$
 ALWAYS mean  $E(X^2)$  and  $NOT$   $(EX)^2$ 

**Definition 5.11.** Two events are independent if 
$$P(A \cap B) = P(A)P(B)$$
.

**Definition 5.12.** The events  $A_1, \ldots, A_n$  are independent if for any sub-collection  $A_{i_1}, \ldots, A_{i_k}$  we have

$$P(A_{i_1} \cap A_{i_2} \cap \dots \cap A_{i_k}) = P(A_{i_1})P(A_{i_2}) \cdots P(A_{i_k})$$
.

$$\frac{P(A_{i_1} \cap A_{i_2} \cap \cdots \cap A_{i_k}) = P(A_{i_1})P(A_{i_2}) \cdots P(A_{i_k})}{P(A_{i_1} \cap A_{i_2} \cap \cdots \cap A_{i_k}) = P(A_{i_1})P(A_{i_2}) \cdots P(A_{i_k})}.$$
Remark 5.13. When  $n > 2$ , it is not enough to only require  $P(A_1 \cap A_2 \cap \cdots \cap A_n) = P(A_1)P(A_2) \cdots P(A_n)$ 

$$P(A_1 \cap A_2) = P(A_1)P(A_2) P(A_2) P(A_3) P(A_3)$$

$$P(A_1 \cap A_2) = P(A_1)P(A_2) P(A_3) P(A_3) P(A_3) P(A_3) P(A_3)$$

**Definition 5.14.** Two random variables are independent if P(X = x, Y = y) = P(X = x)P(Y = y) for all  $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$ . **Definition 5.15.** The random variables  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$  are independent if for all  $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{R}$  we have  $P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2, ..., X_n = x_n) = P(X_1 = x_1)P(X_2 = x_2) \cdot \cdot \cdot P(X_n = x_n).$ Remark 5.16. Independent random variables are uncorrelated, but not vice versa. **Proposition 5.17.** The coin tosses in our setup are all independent, if and only if, there exists functions  $p_1, \ldots, p_N$  such that  $\underline{p(\omega)} = p_1(\omega_1)p_2(\omega_2)\cdots p_N(\omega_N).$ Notation converious Capital letters -> RV's small letters -> value they take on. 

Coin tosses are indus

(a) The R.V's X, --- Xn one indep. (=)  $\forall \omega_1, \omega_2, -\omega_N \in \mathbb{R}$  we have  $\left(\left\{\left(\omega_{1},\omega_{2},\ldots,\omega_{N}\right)\right\}\right)$ call this tiles I (X = WAN) P(X=U1)---

• Let 
$$N \in \mathbb{N}$$
,  $d_1, \ldots, d_N \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\Omega = \{1, \ldots, d_1\} \times \{1, \ldots, d_n\} \times \cdots \times \{1, \ldots, d_N\}$ .
• That is  $\Omega = \{\omega \mid \omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_N), \ \omega_i \in \{1, \ldots, d_i\}\}$ .
•  $d_n = 2$  for all  $n$  corresponds to flipping a two sided coin at every time step.

Definition 5.18. We define a filtration on  $\Omega$  as follows:

$$P_0 = \{\emptyset, \Omega\}. \qquad \text{for all } v \text{ for all } v \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{F}_1.$$

$$P_n = \text{ all events that can be described by only the first coin toss (die roll). E.g. } \underline{A} = \{\omega \mid \omega_1 = H\} \in \mathcal{F}_1.$$

More precisely, given  $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_N) \in \Omega$  and  $n \in \{0, \ldots, N\}$  define

$$\prod_{i} \Pi_{n}(\underline{\omega}) = \{\underline{\omega}' \in \Omega \mid \underline{\omega}' = (\underline{\omega}'_{1}, \dots, \underline{\omega}'_{N}) \text{ and } \underline{\omega}'_{i} = \underline{\omega}_{i} \text{ for all } i \leq n\}.$$
Now  $\mathcal{F}_{n}$  is defined by  $\mathcal{F}_{n} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\underline{A} \subseteq \Omega \mid A = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \Pi_{n}(\underline{\omega}^{i}), \ \underline{\omega}^{1}, \dots, \underline{\omega}^{k} \in \underline{\Omega} \}$ 

$$Remark 5.19. \text{ Note } \{\emptyset, \Omega\} = \mathcal{F}_{0} \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{1} \subseteq \dots \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{N} = \mathcal{P}(\Omega).$$
Question 5.20. Let  $\Omega = \{H, T\}^{3} \cong \{1, 2\}^{3}$ . What are  $\mathcal{F}_{0}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_{3}$ ?

 $\omega' = (\omega_1, \omega_2, \dots \omega_N) \qquad M = 1$   $(\omega)$ 

# **Definition 5.21.** Let $n \in \{0, ..., N\}$ . We say a random variable X is $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable if $X(\omega)$ only depends on $\omega_1, ..., \omega_n$ $\triangleright$ Equivalently, for any $B \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ , the event $\{X \in B\} \in \mathcal{F}_n$ .

 $\triangleright$  Equivalently, if  $\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)$  then  $X(\omega') = X(\omega)$ .

Question 5.22. Let  $X(\omega) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \omega_1 - 10\omega_2$ . For what n is  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable?

Please enable vides if passible. Office Hours today: End it 5:00 PM. Sample som -> N com toeses)  $\omega \in \mathcal{S}$ .  $\omega = (\omega_1, -1, \omega_N) \longrightarrow \omega_2 \in \mathcal{Z}^{-1}, 1\mathcal{Z} \longrightarrow \text{ordone of the cointiess}$  Vishalizer as Incle E SL (N=3) $\omega$ -(-1,1,1)i.e. Males = { W G SL  $\omega' = (\omega'_1) - \omega_N$  $\mathcal{L}_{\omega} = \omega_{\omega}$ M=1. Dras M(W)  $\omega_{n} = \omega_{n}$  ( W=(-1,1,1)

### 5.2. Filtrations.

- Let  $N \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $d_1, \ldots, d_N \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $\Omega = \{1, \ldots, d_1\} \times \{1, \ldots, d_n\} \times \cdots \times \{1, \ldots, d_N\}$ .
- That is  $\Omega = \{\omega \mid \omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N), \omega_i \in \{1, \dots, d_i\}\}.$
- $d_n = 2$  for all n corresponds to flipping a two sided coin at every time step.

## **Definition 5.18.** We define a *filtration* on $\Omega$ as follows:

- $\triangleright \mathcal{F}_0 = \{\emptyset, \Omega\}.$
- $\triangleright \mathcal{F}_1$  = all events that can be described by only the first coin toss (die roll). E.g.  $A = \{\omega \mid \omega_1 = H\} \in \mathcal{F}_1$ .
- $\triangleright \mathcal{F}_n$  = all events that can be described by only the first n coin tosses.

More precisely, given 
$$\omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \in \Omega$$
 and  $n \in \{0, \dots, N\}$  define

More precisely, given 
$$\omega = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_N) \in \Omega$$
 and  $n \in \{0, \dots, N\}$  define

$$\Pi_n(\omega) = \{\omega' \in \Omega \mid \omega' = (\omega'_1, \dots, \omega'_N) \text{ and } \omega'_i = \omega_i \text{ for all } i \leqslant n\}.$$
Now  $\mathcal{F}_n$  is defined by 
$$\mathcal{F}_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ A \subseteq \Omega \mid A = \bigcup_{i=1}^{k} \Pi_i(\omega^i), \ \omega^1, \dots, \omega^k \in \Omega \right\}$$

Now 
$$\mathcal{F}_n$$
 is defined by  $\mathcal{F}_n = \{A \subseteq \Omega \mid A = \bigcup_{i=1}^n \square_i \omega^i\}, \ \omega^1, \dots, \omega^N \in \Omega\}$ 

Remark 5.19. Note 
$$\{\emptyset, \Omega\} = \mathcal{F}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{F}_1 \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{F}_N = \mathcal{P}(\Omega)$$
.

# Question 5.20. Let $\Omega = \{H, T\}^3 \cong \{1, 2\}^3$ . What are $\mathcal{F}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_3$ ?

$$S = \{-1, 1\}^3$$

$$(-1 \rightarrow toils + 1 \rightarrow Heds)$$


Compile 
$$f_0 = \{ \emptyset, \Omega \}$$

$$f_1 = \{ \emptyset, \Omega \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,-1), (1,-1,1) \}, (1,1,-1), (1,1,-1) \}$$

$$\{ (1,1,1), (-1,1,-1), (1,1,-1) \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,-1) \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,-1) \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,-1) \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,-1,1) \}, \{ (1,1,1), (1,1,1), (1,1,1) \}, \{ ($$

$$\Pi_2(1,1,1) = \{(1,1,-1), (1,1,1)\}$$

$$\Pi_{2}(|||,||) = \{(||,||,||)\} 
\Pi_{2}(||,||,||) = \{(||,-||,||)\} 
\Pi_{2}(||,-||,||) = \{(||,-||,||)\}$$



## 5.3. Conditional expectation.

**Definition 5.23.** Let X be a random variable, and  $n \leq N$ . We define  $E(X \mid \mathcal{F}_n) = E_n X$  to be the random variable given by

$$( \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N}} ) ( \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{N$$

Remark 5.24.  $E_nX$  is the "best approximation" of X given only the first n coin tosses.

*Remark* 5.25. The above formula does not generalize well to infinite probability spaces. We will develop a definition that does generalize; after we have that definition we will never ever ever use this formula.

$$E_{n}X = E(X \mid \mathcal{E}_{n}) = \text{condition expectation of } X \text{ Given } \mathcal{E}_{n}.$$

$$NOTE : E_{n}X \text{ is a } \mathcal{E}_{n} - \text{meas } \text{Random Variable}$$

$$Note E_{n}X(\omega) = \text{ang of } X \text{ over the event } \Pi_{n}(\omega) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} F(\omega) X(\omega')$$

**Proposition 5.26.** The conditional expectation  $E_nX$  defined by the above formula satisfies the following two properties:

- (1)  $E_nX$  is an  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable random variable.
- (2) For every  $\underline{\underline{A}} \in \underline{\underline{\mathcal{F}}}_n$ ,  $\sum_{\omega \in A} \underline{\underline{E}}_n X(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} \underline{\underline{X}}(\omega) p(\omega)$ .

Then 
$$EX = \sum_{\omega \in A} X(\omega) + (\omega)$$
.

Then  $EX = \sum_{\omega \in A} X(\omega) + (\omega)$ .

By (2) also have  $EX = \sum_{\omega \in A} E_{\omega}X(\omega) + (\omega) = E(E_{\omega}X)$ .

Lecture 6 (9/13). Please enable your video if possible. Given any security with dayoff Vn at time N. (for nice markets) AFP at fine  $n \leq N$ is Conditional exp of VN (wort the Risk Neutral Monare 17)

 $F_{n}$  = all ends desembate by only first a coins  $= \frac{2}{4} = 2 \quad A = 0 \quad A$  $\Pi_{m}(\omega) = \{ \omega' \in \Omega \mid \omega_{i} = \omega_{i} \mid \forall i \leq m \}$ W = Yellow highest paller  $\Pi_2(\omega) = pink highighed thys.$ 

#### 5.3. Conditional expectation.

**Definition 5.23.** Let X be a random variable, and  $n \leq N$ . We define  $E(X \mid \mathcal{F}_n) = E_n X$  to be the random variable given by

$$E_n X(\omega) = \frac{\sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)} p(\omega') X(\omega')}{\sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)} p(\omega')}, \quad \text{where} \quad \Pi_n(\omega) = \{\omega' \in \Omega \mid \omega_1' = \omega_1, \dots, \omega_n' = \omega_n\}$$

Remark 5.24.  $E_nX$  is the "best approximation" of X given only the first n coin tosses.

Remark 5.25. The above formula does not generalize well to infinite probability spaces. We will develop a definition that does generalize; after we have that definition we will never ever ever use this formula.

$$E_{n} \times (\omega) = A_{nege} \text{ as } \times \text{ on the ent } \Pi_{n}(\omega)$$

$$= \frac{1}{P(\Pi_{n}(\omega))} \times (\omega') + (\omega').$$

**Proposition 5.26.** The conditional expectation  $E_nX$  defined by the above formula satisfies the following two properties:  $(\mathcal{V}) E_n X$  is an  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable random variable.

 $(2) For every A \in \mathcal{F}_n, \sum_{\omega \in A} \mathbf{E}_n X(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} X(\omega) p(\omega).$ Note (2) -> Assege of EnX on any En-mens event A = Ange of X 11 he save ent A. Note:  $A \in \mathcal{F}_n$ . Ange of  $\mathcal{F}_n \times \mathcal{M}$  on  $A = \frac{1}{P(A)} \sum_{\omega' \in A} \mathcal{F}_n \times (\omega') + (\omega')$ 

Awge of X on  $A = \frac{1}{P(A)} \sum_{w' \in A} X(w') f(w')$ 

Play D: NTS 
$$E_{n}X$$
 is  $E_{n}$  meas.

[i.e. NTS: If  $\omega \in S$  is such lad  $\omega_{i} = \omega_{i}$   $\forall i \in n$ 

then  $E_{n}X(\omega) = E_{n}X(\omega)$ 

Play Note: If  $\omega$  is as above

 $\Pi_{n}(\omega) = \Pi_{n}(\omega)$ 

Here  $E_{n}X(\omega) = \frac{1}{F(\Pi_{n}(\omega))} \frac{1}{\omega' \in \Pi_{n}(\omega)} \times (\omega') = \frac{1}{F(\omega')}$ 

$$= \frac{1}{P(\Pi_n(\omega))} \frac{1}{\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)} \times \frac{1}{P(\omega')} = \frac{1}{P(\omega')} \times \frac{1}{P(\omega')} = \frac{1}{P(\omega')} \times \frac{1}{P(\omega)} \times \frac{1}{P(\omega')} \times \frac{1}{$$

Proof of (2):
(1) For any 
$$\omega \in \Omega$$
, 
$$\sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)} \mathbf{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') = \sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)} X(\omega') p(\omega')$$
Proof of (2):
$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') = \mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') = \mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega')$$

$$\mathbb{E}_n X(\omega') p(\omega') p(\omega'$$

Note  $\forall \omega' \in \Pi_n(\omega)$ ,  $E_nX(\omega') = E_nX(\omega)$  (by fact 1).

$$\Rightarrow$$
 LHS =  $Z_{\omega' \in \Pi_{\alpha}(\omega)} \in {}_{\alpha}X(\omega') \neq (\omega')$ 

$$= \sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_{n}(\omega)} E_{n} X(\omega) + (\omega') = E_{n} X(\omega) + (\Pi_{n}(\omega))$$

 $\omega' \in \Pi_{n}(\omega)$ 

$$\omega' \in \Pi_{\mathfrak{A}}(\omega)$$

by funda for  $E_n X = X(\omega) \phi(\omega') = RHS$ 

(2) For any Air 
$$\Omega$$
, then there exist  $\omega^1, \ldots, \omega^k \in \Omega$  such that A is the disjoint union of  $\Pi_n(\omega^1), \ldots, \Pi_n(\omega^k)$ .

Say (for fictine).

$$A = \Pi_n(\omega') \cup \Pi_n(\omega^2)$$

Obso  $H \omega'$ ,  $\omega^2 \in \Omega$ .


$$\text{Filher} \quad \bigcirc \Pi_{n}(\omega') = \Pi_{n}(\omega^{2}) \quad \text{OR} \\ \bigcirc \Pi_{n}(\omega') \cap \Pi_{n}(\omega^{2}) = \emptyset$$


(3) Hence 
$$\sum_{\omega \in A} E_n X(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \sum_{\omega \in \Pi_n(\omega^i)} E_n X(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{\kappa} \sum_{\omega \in \Pi_n(\omega^i)} X(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} X(\omega) p(\omega)$$
.

$$W \in \Pi_n(\omega)$$

**Proposition 5.27** (Uniqueness). If Y and Z are two  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable random variables such that  $\sum_{\omega \in A} Y(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} Z(\omega) p(\omega)$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{F}_n$ , then we must have P(Y = Z) = 1.

IOV Proof (Next time)





Lecture 7 (9/15). Please enable your video if you can. hat time:  $E_n \times (\omega) = cond \circ exp of \times gimen &$  $= \frac{1}{P(\Pi_{n}(\omega))} \sum_{\omega' \in \Pi_{n}(\omega)} X(\omega) + (\omega)$ = Auge of X on the event \( \Omega \) = Ang of X our over all fossible future coin to sees given that the first in home come up  $\omega_1, \omega_2 - \omega_n$ .

Proposition 5.27 (Uniqueness). If 
$$Y$$
 and  $Z$  are two  $F_n$ -measurable random variables such that  $\sum_{\omega \in A} Y(\omega) p(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} Z(\omega) p(\omega)$  for every  $A \in F_n$ , then we must have  $P(Y = Z) = 1$ .

Note any of  $Y$  on  $A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (a)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (b)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (c)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (d)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (a)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (b)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (b)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (c)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (d)  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (e) where  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & \omega \in A \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & Y(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & Y(\omega) & P(\omega) \\ P(A) & W(A) \end{bmatrix}$  (for  $P(A) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & Y(\omega) &$ 


By assurbin 
$$\sum_{\omega \in A} \gamma(\omega) \phi(\omega) = \sum_{\omega \in A} Z(\omega) \phi(\omega)$$

Note 
$$\forall \omega \in A \ /(\omega) > 2(\omega)$$

Only found if  $f(\omega) = 0 \ \forall \omega \in A \ (\text{or } A = \phi)$ 
 $\Rightarrow P(A) = 0$ 
 $\Rightarrow P(Y > Z) = 0$ 


Similarly can show  $P(Y < Z) = 0$   $\Rightarrow P(Y = Z) = 1$ 

OFF.



Example 5.30. Let  $S_n$  be the stock price in the binomial model after n periods. Compute  $E_1S_3$ ,  $E_2S_3$ . Flip a coin at emy time step Stails with from q = 1-q.  $S_{n+1} = \begin{cases} u S_u & \text{if } n+1 \text{ com } v_1 \\ d S_u & \text{if } n+1 \text{ coin } \text{flips } \text{failes}. \end{cases}$ 50 = 1.

N



$$\Rightarrow E_{2}S_{3}(-1,1) * = u^{2}d + u^{2}$$

**Theorem 5.31.** (1) If X, Y are two random variables and  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ , then  $E_n(X + \alpha Y) = E_n X + \alpha E_n Y$ . (On homework) (Tower property) If  $\underline{m} \leq \underline{n}$ , then  $E_m(E_nX) = E_mX$ . If X is  $\mathcal{F}_{n}$  measurable, and Y is any random variable, then  $\mathbf{F}_{n}(XY) = X\mathbf{E}_{n}Y$ Son X is & - meas

W

If of Tona: NTS 
$$m = \alpha$$
. If  $E_m(E_m X) = E_m X$ .

O Will show  $\Omega$   $E_m(E_n X)$  is  $E_m$  weas  $Z$  Fine leave  $E_m(e_n y_n)$  is  $E_m$  was.

 $P_{\alpha}$ :  $P_{\alpha}$ 

 $P_{\xi} \neq E_{m}: \forall A \in \mathcal{E}_{\underline{m}}, \quad \mathcal{A} \text{ any } RV \neq \mathcal{A}$   $\sum_{\omega \in A} E_{\underline{m}} \wedge (\omega) \neq (\omega) = \sum_{A} \gamma(\omega) \neq (\omega)$ 

**Theorem 5.32.** If X is independent of  $\mathcal{F}_n$  then  $\mathbf{E}_n X = \mathbf{E} X$ .

**Theorem 5.33** (Independence lemma). If X is independent of  $\mathcal{F}_n$  and Y is  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable, and  $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$  is a function then  $\mathbf{E}_n f(X,Y) = \sum_{i=1}^m f(x_i,Y) \mathbf{P}(X=x_i)$ , where  $\{x_1,\ldots,x_m\} = X(\Omega)$ .

## 5.4. Martingales.

**Definition 5.34.** A stochastic process is a collection of random variables  $X_0, X_1, \ldots, X_N$ .

**Definition 5.35.** A stochastic process is adapted if  $X_n$  is  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable for all n. (Non-anticipating.)

Question 5.36. Is  $X_n(\omega) = \sum_{i \le n} \omega_i$  adapted?

Question 5.37. Is  $X_n(\omega) = \omega_n$  adapted? Is  $X_n(\omega) = 15$  adapted? Is  $X_n(\omega) = \omega_{15}$  adapted? Is  $X_n(\omega) = \omega_{N-i}$  adapted?

Remark 5.38. We will always model the price of assets by adapted processes. We will also only consider trading strategies which are adapted.

Example 5.39 (Money market). Let  $Y_0 = Y_0(\omega) = a \in \mathbb{R}$ . Define  $Y_{n+1} = (1+r)Y_n$ . (Here r is the interest rate.)

Example 5.40. Suppose  $\Omega = \{\pm 1\}^N \cong \{H, T\}^N \cong \{1, 2\}^N$ . Let  $S_0 = a \in \mathbb{R}$ . Define  $S_{n+1}(\omega) = \begin{cases} uS_n(\omega) & \omega_{n+1} = 1, \\ dS_n(\omega) & \omega_{n+1} = -1. \end{cases}$ 

Is  $S_n$  adapted? (Used to model stock price in the multi-period Binomial model.)

**Definition 5.41.** We say an adapted process  $M_n$  is a martingale if  $E_n M_{n+1} = M_n$ . (Recall  $E_n Y = E(Y \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$ .)

Remark 5.42. Intuition: A martingale is a "fair game".


Example 5.43 (Unbiased random walk). If  $X_1, \ldots, X_N$  are i.i.d. and mean zero, then  $S_n = \sum_{k=1}^n X_k$  is a martingale.

Question 5.44. If M is a martingale, and  $m \leq n$ , is  $E_m M_n = M_m$ ?

**Question 5.45.** If M is a martingale does  $EM_n$  change with n?

**Question 5.46.** Conversely, if  $EM_n$  is constant, is M a martingale?

Lecture 8 (9/17) Please enable your video if you can. 



Let 
$$\{a_{i}, -a_{k}\} = Rayl of MX$$
.

None  $A = \bigcup_{i=1}^{k} \{X = x_{i}\} \cap A$  (disj wion)

 $Z \times X(\omega) = X(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \{X = x_{i}\}} X(\omega) = X(\omega)$ 

 $= \sum_{n} (x_n) f_n(w) f(w)$ 

i=1 6EAN {X=7,3

 $= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \eta_i \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \exists X = \eta_i} E_{\alpha} Y(\omega) \varphi(\omega),$ 

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \chi_{i} \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \{X = X_{i}\} \setminus i} \chi(\omega) + (\omega) \qquad (\text{o. A } \cap \{X = X_{i}\} \setminus i)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \{X = X_{i}\} \setminus i} \chi(\omega) + (\omega) \qquad (\text{o. X is } \mathcal{E}_{n-meas}).$$

$$= \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \{X = X_{i}\} \setminus i} \chi(\omega) + (\omega) \qquad (\text{o. X is } \mathcal{E}_{n-meas}).$$

$$= \sum_{\omega \in A \cap \{X = X_{i}\} \setminus i} \chi(\omega) + (\omega) \qquad (\text{o. X is } \mathcal{E}_{n-meas}).$$

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QED.

**Theorem 5.32.** If X is independent of  $\mathcal{F}_n$  then  $E_nX = EX$ . (i.e. for every AEEn & BER, the everts A&B are ind) (=) X is ind of En, if Rouge (X) = 2 x1, - x 1/2 L tieq, - be the the A L EX=7; & are inol) Ho Assure X invol of 8m. En () = EX ive NFS @ EX is En

EX is & were Yn. of of Stud with RHS. Let Roge (X) = Ex,, - nk?

A= Q A 1 { X = 9; }.

$$\frac{1}{2} \times (\omega) = (\omega)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{k} \pi_i \times (\omega)$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{$$

$$= P(A) \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_i P(X=a_i)$$

$$= P(A) \cdot EX = \sum_{w \in A} EX + (w) \cdot DED.$$

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**Theorem 5.33** (Independence lemma). If X is independent of  $\mathcal{F}_n$  and Y is  $\mathcal{F}_n$ -measurable, and  $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$  is a function then

$$E_n f(X,Y) = \sum_{i=1}^m f(x_i,Y) P(X=x_i), \quad where \{x_1,\ldots,x_m\} = X(\Omega).$$

Raye 
$$(X) = \{X_1, \dots, x_m\}$$
.  $y \in \mathbb{R}$  (a real #).

$$E = \{X_1, y_1, \dots, y_m\} = \{x_1, y_1, \dots, y_m\}$$

$$= \{x_1, y_1, \dots, y_m\} = \{x_1, y_1, \dots, y_m\}$$

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## Lecture 8 (9/20). Please Enable Your Video If you Can

hast time: Stochastic process " X is a RV You. Adapted): Un, need X<sub>n</sub> to be 8<sub>n</sub> meas. (i.e. X, is & meas & All trains of other prices etc. Interior : Mantinpale \_ "Foir Game" My - adapted Stochastic process. O: Shalk away at time in with \$ Min in hand. I Play once more & Keep playing if game is fain

At true n say find n coins come up W, , W2 -- Wm. Let  $W = \left( w_1, w_2 - w_n \right) \star \star - \ldots$ Cash in band for this seg at time  $n = M_n(\omega)$ Experial noturn if I play once more, given the finit n. coins are (w,, .- wn) : [En Mat]

If En Mary = Man & Game is fair o

**Definition** 5.41. We say an adapted process  $M_n$  is a martingale if  $\underline{E}_n M_{n+1} = \underline{M}_n$ . (Recall  $\underline{E}_n Y = \underline{E}(Y \mid \mathcal{F}_n)$ .) Remark 5.42. Intuition: A martingale is a "fair game" Example 5.43 (Unbiased random walk). If  $X_1, \ldots, \underline{X}_N$  are i.i.d. and mean zero, then  $S_n = \sum_{k=1}^n X_k$  is a martingale. Exe = 0

2 indebically dist.

Exe = 0  $X_1 = X_2 = 0$   $X_2 = X_3 = 0$   $X_3 = X_4 = 0$   $X_4 = X_4 = 0$  Sn = cumatine winings who time n. lution > seem like a foin forme.

Math: 
$$E_{n}(S_{n+1}) \xrightarrow{NTS} S_{n}$$

$$= E_{n}(S_{n} + X_{n+1})$$

$$= E_{n}S_{n} + E_{n}X_{n+1}$$

$$= S_{n} + E_{n}X_{n+1} = S_{n} \Rightarrow S_{is} = S_{n}$$


$$\Rightarrow E_{n}S_{n+1} = S_{n} \Rightarrow S_{is} = S_{n}$$

Example 5.44 (Drawing balls without replacement). Red or Blue balls are drawn from a container without replacement. The container has 2 red and 2 balls initially. You win \$1 if the ball is blue, and lose \$1 if the ball is red. Is the process of your winnings a martingale?

hness: Not a Mg.

Comparte 
$$E_1M_2$$
.

 $M_1(\omega) = \begin{cases} 1 & \omega_1 = blue \\ -1 & \omega_2 = red \end{cases}$ 



Confide 
$$E_1 M_2$$
.?


$$Z(\frac{1}{3}) + 0 = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$-\frac{2}{3}$$

$$E_1 M_2$$
Wat a ma.!

Question 5.45. If M is a martingale, and  $m \leq n$ , is  $E_m M_n = M_m$ ? Em Mmy = Mm. Q° Comple Em Mm+2° det of mg with m = m+1 Em Matz (toper) Em Emt Mmtz.

**Question 5.46.** If M is a martingale does  $EM_n$  change with n? nat chance with homa: For any RVZ, Phys Know  $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}_n$ ,  $\sum_{w \in A} E_n Z(w) \varphi(w) = \sum_{w \in A} Z(\omega) \varphi(w)$ . Unase  $A = S_2$ :  $\Rightarrow E E_n t = \sum_{\alpha \in S_1} E_n t^{\alpha}(\alpha) \phi(\alpha)$ 




Bear To Poul to Gan Question.


An, EMNTI = EMMNTI = EMN.

Leuna Defating = EMM

## **Question 5.47.** Conversely, if $EM_n$ is constant, is M a martingale?



Q: X, X, ... are all ind Is the page X a mg? Not a Mg En Xn+1 Exm+1 comst-# Xm.



Lecture 10 (9/22). Please enable your video if you can.

hast time: Mantingales: >> Fair game. : En Mant = Man.)

(All processes are adapted)

hast time: M is a my => EM\_n = EM, If m. (constant expertation)
Comme is false: EM = EM, = EM, = EM my + M is a mg. Question 5.50. Let  $\xi_n$  be a martingale with  $E\xi_1 = 0$ . Let  $\Delta_n$  be an adapted process,  $X_0 \in \mathbb{R}$  and define  $X_{n+1} = X_n + \Delta_n \xi_{n+1}$ . Is X a martingale? (Note that  $X_n = X_n \xi_n + \Delta_n \xi_n +$ 

Remark 5.51. Think of  $\xi_n$  as the outcome of a fair game being played. You decide to bet on this game. Let  $\Delta_n$  be your bet at time n; your return from this bet is  $\Delta_n \xi_{n+1}$ , and thus your cumulative return at time n+1 is  $X_{n+1} = X_n + \Delta_n \xi_{n+1}$ .

Adapted is Xn+1 = Xn + In Sn+7

8 - meas & Sn-meas & Sn-meas

Ps: 
$$E_{n} \times_{n+1} = E_{n} \left( \times_{n} + \Delta_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n+1} \right)$$

$$= E_{n} \times_{n} + E_{n} \left( \Delta_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n+1} \right)$$

$$= \sum_{n} \times_{n} + \sum_{n} \left( \Delta_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n+1} \right) \left( \sum_{n} \times_{n} = X_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n} \right)$$

$$= \sum_{n} \times_{n} + \Delta_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n} \cdot \mathbb{I}_{n}$$

= Xn + In 3n = Doecut simplify
further. Will work if we know of En.

Offensiel court simply further

Prate San Mis a mg, Let 3 nt = Mnt - Mn.

$$\Delta_{n} \rightarrow \text{any} \quad \text{adafted} \quad \text{proces.}$$

$$X_{n+1} = X_{n} + \Delta_{n} \left( M_{n+1} - M_{n} \right) = X_{n} + \Delta_{n} \mathcal{S}_{n+1}.$$

$$\text{Claim: In this case } X \stackrel{\text{i.e.}}{=} a \quad \text{mg.}$$

$$\text{Pl: } E_{n} X_{n+1} = E_{n} \left( X_{n} + \Delta_{n} \left( M_{n+1} - M_{n} \right) \right)$$

$$= X_{n} + \Delta_{n} E_{n} \left( M_{n+1} - M_{n} \right)$$

$$= X_{n} + \Delta_{n} E_{n} \left( M_{n+1} - M_{n} \right) = 0$$

$$\text{(io } E_{n} M_{n+1} = M_{n} \Rightarrow E_{n} \left( M_{n+1} - M_{n} \right) = 0$$

#### 5.5. Change of measure.

Example 5.52. Consider i.i.d. coin tosses with  $P(\omega_n = 1) = \underline{p_1}$  and  $P(\omega_n = -1) = \underline{q_1} = 1 - p_1$ . Let  $\underline{u, d} > 0$ ,  $\underline{r} > -1$ . Let  $S_{n+1}(\omega) = uS_n(\omega)$  if  $\omega_{n+1} = 1$ , and  $S_{n+1}(\omega) = dS_n(\omega)$  if  $\omega_{n+1} = -1$ . Let  $D_n = (1+r)^{-n}$  be the "discount factor".

Suppose we now invented a new "risk neutral" coin that comes up heads with probability  $\tilde{p}_1$  and tails with probability  $\tilde{q}_1 = 1 - \tilde{p}_1$ . Let  $\tilde{P}$ ,  $\tilde{E}_n$  etc. denote the probability and conditional expectation with respect to the new "risk neutral" coin. Find  $\tilde{p}_1$  so that  $D_n S_n$  is a  $\tilde{P}$  marting le **P** martingale.

**Theorem 5.53.** Consider a market where  $S_n$  above models a stock price, and r is the interest rate with 0 < d < 1 + r < u. The coins

Theorem 5.53. Consider a market where 
$$S_n$$
 above models a stock price, and  $r$  is the interest rate with  $0 < d < 1 + r < u$ . The coins land heads and tails with probability  $p_1$  and  $q_1$  respectively. If you have a derivative security that pays  $V_N$  at time  $N$ , then the arbitrage free price of this security at time  $n \le N$  is given by
$$V_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n D_N V_N = (1+r)^{n-N} \tilde{E}_n V_N.$$


Remark 5.54. Even though the stock price changes according to a coin that flips heads with probability  $p_1$ , the arbitrage free price is computed using conditional expectations using the risk neutral probability. So when computing  $E_n V_N$ , we use our new invented "risk

neutral" coin that flips heads with probability  $\tilde{p}_1$  and tails with probability  $\tilde{q}_1$ .

- Let  $\underline{p} \colon \Omega \to [0,1]$  be a probability mass function on  $\Omega$ , and  $\underline{P}(\underline{A}) = \sum_{\omega \in A} p(\omega)$  be the probability measure. Let  $\tilde{p} \colon \Omega \to [0,1]$  be another probability mass function, and define a second probability measure  $\tilde{P}$  by  $\tilde{P}(\underline{A}) = \sum_{\omega \in A} \tilde{p}(\omega)$ .
- **Definition 5.55.** We say  $\underline{P}$  and  $\underline{\tilde{P}}$  are equivalent if for every  $\underline{A} \in \mathcal{F}_N$ ,  $\underline{P}(\underline{A}) = 0$  if and only if  $\underline{\tilde{P}}(\underline{A}) = 0$ .

Remark 5.56. When  $\underline{\Omega}$  is finite,  $\underline{P}$  and  $\underline{\tilde{P}}$  are equivalent if and only if we have  $p(\omega) = 0 \iff \tilde{p}(\omega) = 0$  for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ .

We let  $\tilde{E}$ ,  $\tilde{E}_n$  denote the expectation and conditional expectations with respect to  $\tilde{P}$  respectively.



Work out Example 5.52

hoal: Want of so that Don Son is a P mg. i.e. En Dans Su. Let's compute En Suti  $\int_{M+1}^{M+1} (\omega) = \begin{cases} \lambda \\ d \end{cases}$ 

& X is & meas. S<sub>M+1</sub> = X<sub>M+1</sub> S<sub>M</sub> L X is ind of to.  $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{n} \mathbb{S}_{n+1} = \mathbb{E}_{n} \left( \mathbb{X}_{n+1} \mathbb{S}_{n} \right)$ ( o o Sn is Fn mess) = S<sub>M</sub> E<sub>M</sub> X<sub>m+1</sub> ( \* Xnt is ind of En) = Sn ( FX MHI)

$$= S_{n}\left(F_{n} + \left(1-F_{n}\right)d\right).$$

$$\Rightarrow F_{n}S_{n+1} = \left(F_{n} + \left(1-F_{n}\right)d\right). S_{n}$$

Wont Pa San to be a P mg.

 $\stackrel{()}{=} \stackrel{()}{=} \stackrel{()}{=}$ 


Want En (Day Say) = Da Sn.

$$(=) \quad \mathcal{F}_{n} \quad \mathcal{S}_{n+1} = (1+r) \mathcal{S}_{n}.$$

$$(=) \quad (\uparrow_{n} \quad + \quad (1-f_{n}) d) \mathcal{S}_{n} = (1+r) \mathcal{S}_{n}.$$

$$(=) \quad (\uparrow_{n} \quad + \quad (1-f_{n}) d) = 1+r \quad \Rightarrow$$

# Lecture 11 (9/24). Please Enable Your Video If you Can



5.5. Change of measure.

Example 5.52. Consider i.i.d. coin tosses with  $P(\omega_n = 1) = p_1$  and  $P(\omega_n = -1) = q_1 = 1 - p_1$ . Let u, d > 0, r > -1. Let  $S_{n+1}(\omega) = uS_n(\omega)$  if  $\omega_{n+1} = 1$ , and  $S_{n+1}(\omega) = dS_n(\omega)$  if  $\omega_{n+1} = -1$ . Let  $D_n = (1+r)^{-n}$  be the "discount factor".

Suppose we now invented a new "risk neutral" coin that comes up heads with probability  $\tilde{p}_1$  and tails with probability  $\tilde{q}_1 = 1 - \tilde{p}_1$ . Let  $\tilde{P}, \tilde{E}_n$  etc. denote the probability and conditional expectation with respect to the new "risk neutral" coin. Find  $\tilde{p}_1$  so that  $D_n S_n$  is a P martingale.

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 $V_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{\mathbf{E}}_n D_N V_N = (1+r)^{n-N} \tilde{\mathbf{E}}_n V_N.$ 

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Cand exp want the wisk mentral mercane P

- hast time.
- Let p: Ω → [0,1] be a probability mass function on Ω, and P(A) = ∑ω∈A p(ω) be the probability measure.
  Let p: Ω → [0,1] be another probability mass function, and define a second probability measure P by P(A) = ∑ω∈A p(ω).

**Definition 5.55.** We say P and  $\tilde{P}$  are equivalent if for every  $A \in \mathcal{F}_N$ , P(A) = 0 if and only if  $\tilde{P}(A) = 0$ .

Remark 5.56. When  $\Omega$  is finite,  $\vec{P}$  and  $\tilde{\vec{P}}$  are equivalent if and only if we have  $p(\omega) = 0 \iff \tilde{p}(\omega) = 0$  for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ .

We let  $\tilde{E}$ ,  $\tilde{E}_n$  denote the expectation and conditional expectations with respect to  $\tilde{P}$  respectively.

Work out Example 5.52. Sati = Xati Sn & Xati is ind of for (noder P),

$$\mathcal{E}_{n}S_{n+1} = \mathcal{E}_{n}(X_{n+1}S_{n}) = S_{n}\mathcal{E}_{n}X_{n+1} = S_{n}\mathcal{E}_{n}X_{n+1}$$

Want 
$$D_n S_n$$
 to be a  $P$  my

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n = P_n S_n + P_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n + P_n S_n + P_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n + P_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n S_n = P_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n S_n$$

$$\stackrel{()}{\leftarrow} P_n S_n$$


$$\Rightarrow (f_1 u + g_1 d) S_u = (1+r) S_{u_1}.$$

$$\Rightarrow f_1 u + g_1 d = 1+r$$

$$\Rightarrow f_1 u + (1-f_1) d = 1+r$$

$$\Rightarrow f_1$$

Example 5.57. Let  $\Omega$  be the sample space corresponding to N i.i.d. fair coins (heads is 1, tails is -1). Let  $\underline{a} \in \mathbb{R}$  and define  $X_{n+1}(\omega) = X_n(\omega) + \omega_{n+1} + a$ . For what a is there an equivalent measure  $\tilde{P}$  such that X is a martingale?



#### 6. The multi-period binomial model

#### 6.1. Risk Neutral Pricing.

- In the multi-period binomial model we assume  $\Omega = \{\pm 1\}^N$  corresponds to a probability space with N i.i.d. coins.
- Let u, d > 0,  $S_0 > 0$ , and define  $S_{n+1} = \begin{cases} uS_n & \omega_{n+1} = 1, \\ dS_n & \omega_{n+1} = -1. \end{cases}$
- u and d are called the up and down factors respectively.
- Without loss, can assume d < u.
- Always assume no coins are deterministic:  $p_1 = P(\omega_n = 1) > 0$  and  $q_1 = 1 p_1 = P(\omega_n = -1) > 0$ .
- We have access to a bank with interest rate r > -1.
- $D_n = (1+r)^{-n}$  be the discount factor (§1 at time n is worth \$D\_n\$ at time 0.)

**Theorem 6.1.** There exists a (unique) equivalent measure  $\tilde{P}$  under which process  $D_nS_n$  is a martingale if and only if d < 1 + r < u. In this case  $\tilde{P}$  is the probability measure obtained by tossing  $\tilde{N}$  i.i.d. coins with this case  $\tilde{P}$  is the probability measure obtained by tossing  $\tilde{N}$  i.i.d. coins with

$$\tilde{P}(\omega_n = 1) = \tilde{p}_1 = \frac{1 + r - d}{u - d}, \qquad \tilde{P}(\omega_n = -1) = \tilde{q}_1 = \frac{u - (1 + r)}{u - d}.$$

**Definition 6.2.** An equivalent measure  $\tilde{P}$  under which  $\overline{D_n}S_n$  is a martingale is called the *risk neutral measure*.

Remark 6.3. If there are more than one risky assets,  $S^1, \ldots, S^k$ , then we require  $D_n S_n^1, \ldots, D_n S_n^k$  to all be martingales under the risk neutral measure P.

Remark 6.4. The Risk Neutral Pricing Formula says that any security with payoff  $V_N$  at time N has arbitrage free price  $V_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n(D_N V_N)$ at time n.

 $\frac{2}{N} = \frac{N - (1+n)}{N - d} \in (0, 1)$ By example alone we wow  $E_n(D_{n+1}S_{n+1}) = D_nS_n$ The can be obtained by using it of tosses of a coin that loss bears with for the tails with the trip.

Pf of them Gol:

2 Reverse direction: Only choice of Filty for which En (Dan San) = Da Sa is given by  $\frac{1}{h} = \frac{h - (1+n)}{h - d}$ . I I thr < d > Pi < O > Pi is not a prot measure. If  $1+r=d \Rightarrow \tilde{f}=0$ .  $\tilde{f}$  is a find wees but P is NOT equiv to P.

If Itr>n => % < 0 => % is not a proof meas, 1 II = QN = 7 = 0 => Pis a prot mens but NOT equiv to P.

OED,

Lecture 12 (9/27). Please enable your video if you can.

### 6. The multi-period binomial model

## 6.1. Risk Neutral Pricing.

- In the multi-period binomial model we assume  $\Omega = \{\pm 1\}^{N}$  corresponds to a probability space with N i.i.d. coins.
- Let u, d > 0,  $S_0 > 0$ , and define  $S_{n+1} = \begin{cases} uS_n & \omega_{n+1} = 1, \\ dS_n & \omega_{n+1} = -1. \end{cases}$
- u and d are called the up and down factors respectively.
- Without loss, can assume d < u.
- Always assume no coins are deterministic:  $\underline{p_1} = \underline{P}(\omega_n = 1) > 0$  and  $\underline{q_1} = 1 p_1 = \underline{P}(\omega_n = -1) > 0$ .
- We have access to a bank with interest rate r > -1.

•  $D_n = (1+r)^{-n}$  be the discount factor (\$1 at time n is worth \$D\_n\$ at time 0.) **Theorem 6.1.** There exists a (unique) equivalent measure  $\tilde{\underline{P}}$  under which process  $D_n S_n$  is a martingale if and only if d < 1 + r < u. In

this case  $\tilde{P}$  is the probability measure obtained by tossing N i.i.d. coins with


$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}(\omega_n = 1) = \underline{\tilde{p}_1} = \frac{1 + r - d}{u - d}, \qquad \tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}(\omega_n = -1) = \underline{\tilde{q}_1} = \frac{u - (1 + r)}{u - d}.$$

**Definition 6.2.** An equivalent measure  $\tilde{P}$  under which  $D_nS_n$  is a martingale is called the *risk neutral measure*.

Remark 6.3. If there are more than one risky assets,  $S^1, \ldots, S^k$ , then we require  $D_n S_n^1, \ldots, D_n S_n^k$  to all be martingales under the risk neutral measure P.

Remark 6.4. The Risk Neutral Pricing Formula says that any security with payoff  $V_N$  at time N has arbitrage free price  $V_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n(D_N V_N)$ at time n. (Note AFP at time 1) = Vn = + E(D, VN)

Example 6.5. Consider two markets in the Binomial model setup with the same u, d, r. In the first market the coin flip heads with probability 99%. In the second the coin flips heads with probability 90%. Are the price of call options in these two markets the same?



Song 
$$S_0 = 1$$
 & compat  $V_0$  (like ofthe)
$$v_2 = v_2 - 1$$

$$V_0 = \frac{1}{E} \left( \frac{D}{V_2} \right)$$

$$V$$

Calculian for ved stock: 
$$f=xally fla game!$$

$$V_{6} = \frac{1}{(HN)^{2}} \left(\frac{1+n-d}{n-d}\right)^{2} \left(\frac{n^{2}-1}{n}\right)$$

- Consider an investor that starts with  $X_0$  wealth, which he divides between cash and the stock.
- If he has  $\Delta_0$  shares of stock at time 0, then  $X_1 = \Delta_0 S_1 + (1+r)(X_0 \Delta_0 S_0)$ .
- We allow the investor to trade at time 1 and hold  $\Delta_1$  shares.
- $\Delta_1$  may be random, but must be  $\mathcal{F}_1$ -measurable.
- Continuing further, we see  $X_{n+1} = \Delta_n S_{n+1} + (1+r)(X_n \Delta_n S_n)$ .
- Both X and  $\Delta$  are adapted processes.

**Definition 6.6.** A self-financing portfolio is a portfolio whose wealth evolves according to

 $\underbrace{X_{n+1}} = \underbrace{\Delta_n S_{n+1}}_{} + (1+r)(X_n - \Delta_n S_n),$ 

for some adapted process  $\Delta_n$ .

Theorem 6.7. Let  $d < 1 \pm r < u$ , and  $\tilde{P}$  be the risk neutral measure, and  $X_n$  represent the wealth of a portfolio at time  $\tilde{n}$  The portfolio is self-financing portfolio if and only if the discounted wealth  $D_nX_n$  is a martingale under  $\tilde{P}$ .

Remark 6.8. The only thing we will use in this proof is that  $D_nS_n$  is a martingale under  $\tilde{P}$ . The interest rate r can be a random adapted process. It is also not special to the binomial model – it works for any model for which there is a risk neutral measure.

( Day of P is that Dn Sn is a P mg)

Before proving Theorem 6.7, we consider a few consequences: **Theorem 6.9.** The multi-period binomial model is arbitrage free if and only if d < 1 + r < u. Remark 6.10. The first fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that a risk neutral measure exists if and only if the market is arbitrage free. (We will prove this in more generality later.) Pf: It No antitroge: We say there is no autitye in the mater if for any celf france portation with wealth process Xu, We have: If  $X_0 = 0$ ,  $X_0 > 0$  thun  $X_0 = 0$  about smally () Clearly de 1+r < d or 1+r > n -> there is and.

(2) Say d<1+r< n.
NTS Home is no only in the matert. Pf: NTS If X = 0, Xn = wealth at time n of a cell bining foutfilia  $\frac{1}{2}$ Know by the 6.7 that If Xn is self firing

thum 
$$D_n X_n$$
 is a  $\widehat{P}$  my,

$$\Rightarrow D_n X_n = \widehat{E}_{un}(D_n X_n) \qquad \text{(ising)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}(D_n X_n) = 0 \qquad \text{know } X_n > 0 \quad \text{a.s.}$$

$$\Rightarrow D_n X_n = 0 \quad \text{a.s.} \Rightarrow X_n = 0 \quad \text{a.s.}$$

**Theorem 6.11** (Risk Neutral Pricing Formula). Let d < 1 + r < u, and  $V_N$  be an  $\mathcal{F}_N$  measurable random variable. Consider a security

that pays 
$$V_N$$
 at maturity time  $N$ . For any  $n \leq N$ , the arbitrage free price of this security is given by 
$$V_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{\boldsymbol{E}}_n(D_N V_N) \,.$$

Remark 6.12. The replicating strategy can be found by backward induction. Let  $\omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega'')$ . Then  $V_{-+,1}(\omega', 1, \omega'') = V_{-+,1}(\omega', -1, \omega'') \qquad V_{-+,1}(\omega', 1) = V_{-+,1}(\omega', -1)$ 

$$\Delta_{n}(\omega) = \frac{V_{n+1}(\omega', 1, \omega'') - V_{n+1}(\omega', -1, \omega'')}{(u - d)S_{n}(\omega)} = \frac{V_{n+1}(\omega', 1) - V_{n+1}(\omega', -1)}{(u - d)S_{n}(\omega)}$$

Proof of Theorem 6.7 part 1. Suppose  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio. Need to show  $D_n X_n$  is a martingale under  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}$ .

Proof of Theorem 6.7 part 2. Suppose  $D_nX_n$  is a martingale under  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}$ . Need to show  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio.

6.2. State processes.

Question 6.13. Consider the N-period binomial model, and a security with payoff  $V_N$ . Let  $X_n$  be the arbitrage free price at time  $n \leq N$ , and  $\Delta_n$  be the number of shares in the replicating portfolio. What is an algorithm to find  $X_n$ ,  $\Delta_n$  for all  $n \leq N$ ? How much is the computational time?

**Theorem 6.14.** Suppose a security pays  $V_N = g(S_N)$  at maturity N for some (non-random) function g. Then the arbitrage free price at time  $n \leq N$  is given by  $V_n = f_n(S_n)$ , where:

(1) 
$$f_N(x) = V_N(x)$$
 for  $x \in \text{Range}(S_N)$ .  
(2)  $f_N(x) = \frac{1}{N} (\tilde{n}f_{N+1}(yx) + \tilde{n}f_{N+1}(dx))$  for  $x \in \text{Range}(S_N)$ 

(1) 
$$f_N(x) = V_N(x)$$
 for  $x \in \text{Range}(S_N)$ .  
(2)  $f_n(x) = \frac{1}{1+r} (\tilde{p}f_{n+1}(ux) + \tilde{q}f_{n+1}(dx))$  for  $x \in \text{Range}(S_n)$ .

Remark 6.15. Reduces the computational time from  $O(2^N)$  to  $O(\sum_{n=0}^{N} |\text{Range}(S_n)|) = O(N^2)$  for the Binomial model.

Remark 6.16. Can solve this to get 
$$f_n(x) = \frac{1}{(1+r)^{N-n}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-n} {N-n \choose k} \tilde{p}^k \tilde{q}^{N-n-k} f_N(xu^k d^{N-n-k})$$

**Question 6.17.** How do we handle other securities? E.g. Asian options (of the form  $g(\sum_{0}^{N} S_k)$ )?

Lecture 13 (10/1). Please enable video if you can.

L

- Consider an investor that starts with  $X_0$  wealth, which he divides between cash and the stock.
- If he has  $\Delta_0$  shares of stock at time 0, then  $X_1 = \Delta_0 S_1 + (1+r)(X_0 \Delta_0 S_0)$ .
- We allow the investor to trade at time 1 and hold  $\Delta_1$  shares.
- $\Delta_1$  may be random, but must be  $\mathcal{F}_1$ -measurable.
- Continuing further, we see  $X_{n+1} = \Delta_n S_{n+1} + (1+r)(X_n \Delta_n S_n)$ .
- Both X and  $\Delta$  are adapted processes.

**Definition 6.6.** A self-financing portfolio is a portfolio whose wealth evolves according to

 $X_{n+1} = \Delta_n S_{n+1} + (1+r)(X_n - \Delta_n S_n),$ 

for some adapted process  $\Delta_n$ .

**Theorem 6.7.** Let d < 1 + r < u, and **P** be the risk neutral measure, and  $X_n$  represent the wealth of a portfolio at time n. The portfolio is self-financing portfolio if and only if the discounted wealth  $D_nX_n$  is a martingale under P.

Remark 6.8. The only thing we will use in this proof is that  $D_n S_n$  is a martingale under P. The interest rate r can be a random adapted process. It is also not special to the binomial model – it works for any model for which there is a risk neutral measure.

\$ IOU a proof of this theren

Before proving Theorem 6.7, we consider a few consequences:

**Theorem 6.9.** The multi-period binomial model is arbitrage free if and only if d < 1 + r < u.

**Definition 6.10.** We say the market is arbitrage free if for any self financing portfolio with wealth process X, we have:  $X_0 = 0$  and  $X_N \ge 0$  implies  $X_N = 0$  almost surely.

Remark 6.11. The first fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that a risk neutral measure exists if and only if the market is arbitrage free. (We will prove this in more generality later.)

SPfo (1) It r & d: Have ont (bornows cook & bony stock > anthoge)

(2) It r > u: Have art (short stock & bonk oach).

(3) d< Itn< n. NTS \$ and

Knows a RNM Exists. Call & P.
Say Xo = O. X - wealth of a self for fortfalso.

Say 
$$X_N > 0$$
. NTS:  $X_N = 0$  almost energy.

Pf: knows (Thu 6.7)  $D_n X_n$  is a  $P$  mg.

$$P_n X_n = E(D_n X_n) \qquad (P_n X_n)$$

$$E(P_n X_n) = 0$$

$$Knows = 0$$

$$D_n X_n > 0$$
San only haffor of  $P_n X_n = 0$ 

$$P_n X_n > 0$$

Sine 
$$D_N = (1+r)^N \Rightarrow X_N = 0$$
 ( $\widehat{P}$  a.s.)  
 $\Rightarrow X_N = 0$  ( $P$  a.s.).

> No ont QED,

$$V_{n} = \frac{1}{D_{n}} E_{n}(D_{N}V_{N}). = (1+n) \quad \text{EV}_{N}.$$

$$(V_{N} \rightarrow \text{formally}, e.g., V_{N} = (S_{N} - K_{N})$$

$$\text{Pf: Reflication} \rightarrow W. || \text{find is sell fining formally} \text{formally} \text{formall$$

Find  $X_N$ : Let  $X_N = V_N$ .

For 
$$M \leq N$$
, Let  $X_n = \frac{1}{D_n} E_n D_N V_N = \frac{1}{$ 

 $P_{s}: \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N}(D_{N+1}X_{N+1}) = \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N}(D_{N+1} \cdot \frac{1}{D_{N+1}} \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N}(D_{N}X_{N}))$   $= \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N}(\stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N+1}(D_{N}X_{N})) = \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{N}(D_{N}X_{N})$ 

$$= D_{n} \times_{n} \qquad (\text{oly of } \times_{n})$$

$$\Rightarrow D_{n} \times_{n} \text{ is a } \widehat{P} \text{ mg}$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{n} = \text{wealth} \qquad \text{if a self fin } P_{k} \qquad (\text{Thun } 6.7.)$$

$$\text{Sino } X_{n} = V_{k} \Rightarrow X_{n} = \text{Af } P \text{ of see at time } n.$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Af } P \text{ of } \text{see} = X_{n} = \frac{1}{D_{n}} \sum_{n} (D_{n} \times_{n}) \cdot \text{QED}.$$

$$X_{N} = V_{N}$$
 (Ref. ).

Remark 6.13. The replicating strategy can be found by backward induction. Let  $\omega = (\underline{\omega}', \omega_{n+1}, \underline{\psi}'')$ . Then

 $\Delta_n(\underline{\omega}) = \frac{V_{n+1}(\omega', 1, \omega'') - V_{n+1}(\omega', -1, \underline{\omega''})}{(\underline{u} - d)S_n(\omega)} = \frac{V_{n+1}(\omega', 1) - V_{n+1}(\omega', -1)}{(\underline{u} - d)S_n(\omega)}$ 

 $F(X_{n+1} = \Delta_n S_{n+1} + (1+n)(X_n - \Delta_n S_n) \qquad (Nealth of our rect ff)$ 

 $\omega = (\omega_1, -- \omega_n)$ 

 $W' = (\omega_{M+2}, \dots, \omega_{N})$ 

 $S_{n}(\omega)$  (n-d)

6.7) Let X = wealth process of any investor & DuSn's a my under P.

Self jn: (No extend cash flors
2 no looking in juture) > X is anated  $= \Delta_{n} S_{n+1} + (1+n) (X_{n} - \Delta_{n} S_{n})$ h med In to be turding strat.

Stock malet, I stock
M.M. intust note T. Immon : Casino Fair gome = Mg, -> lot | Secure asset (M.M.) Page intust. Discourt cash & bread =0 Ext yield from Stock = up + q d But: und P: Exp yield from dise Stock: up + dp = 1 Proof of Theorem 6.7 part 1. Suppose  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio. Need to show  $D_n X_n$  is a martingale under  $\tilde{P}$ . Pf: know I an adapted trading strat + Xm+1 = &nSn+ (1+r) (Xn-AnSn) (def of self fin). En (Dnfl Xnfl) (Want Dn Xn)  $\widetilde{E}_{n}\left(D_{n+1}X_{n+1}\right) = \widetilde{E}_{n}\left(\Delta_{n}D_{n+1}S_{n+1} + D_{n+1}\left(1+r\right)\left(X_{n} - \Delta_{n}S_{n}\right)\right)$ 

$$= \Delta_{n} \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{n} \left( D_{n+1} S_{n+1} \right) + D_{n} \left( X_{n} - \Delta_{n} S_{n} \right)$$

$$= \Delta_{n} P_{n} S_{n} + D_{n} X_{n} - D_{n} I_{n} S_{n} \qquad (" P_{n} S_{n} I_{n} I_{n}$$

Proof of Theorem 6.7 part 2. Suppose 
$$D_nX_n$$
 is a martingale under  $\tilde{P}$ . Need to show  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio.

Assume 
$$D_n X_n$$
 is  $P$  mg.  $NTF \Delta_n = \Delta_n S_{n+1} + (1+n)(X_n - 2n)$ 

$$\omega = (\omega_1, -\omega_n)$$

$$\omega' = (\omega_1, -\omega_n)$$

$$\omega' = (\omega_1, -\omega_n)$$

Look of 
$$W = (W', W_{n+1})$$
  
Final  $M$ 

 $X_{n+1}(\omega) = X_{n+1}(\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \varkappa)$ 

$$= (\omega_{1})$$

Look at 
$$(X_{n+1}(\omega', 1))$$
.  $\in \mathbb{R}^2$ .

Write  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$  are linearly Ind in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ .

Write  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$  are linearly Ind in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ .

Write  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$  as a linearly  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$  where  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$  are linearly  $\{(\omega', -1)\}$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} X_{n+1}(\omega', 1) \\ X_{n+1}(\omega', -1) \end{pmatrix} = \Delta_{n}(\omega') S_{n}(\omega') \begin{pmatrix} n \\ d \end{pmatrix} + \Gamma_{n}(\omega') \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$S_{n}(\omega') \begin{pmatrix} n \\ d \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} S_{n+1}(\omega', -1) \\ S_{n+1}(\omega', -1) \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{n+1}(\omega) = \Delta_{n}(\omega') S_{n+1}(\omega) + \Gamma_{n}(\omega')$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{n+1} = A_{n}(\omega') S_{n+1}(\omega) + \Gamma_{n}(\omega')$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{n+1} = A_{n}(\omega') S_{n+1}(\omega) + \Gamma_{n}(\omega')$$

$$=) D_{n}X_{n} = \Delta_{n}D_{n}S_{n} + D_{n+1}\Gamma_{n}.$$

$$=) \Gamma_{n} = (1+r)(X_{n} - \Delta_{n}S_{n}) \quad \text{bolish is what we nated}$$

$$QED.$$

Lecture 15 (10/6). Please enable video if you can.

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6.2. State processes.

Question 6.14. Consider the N-period binomial model, and a security with payoff  $V_N$ . Let  $X_n$  be the arbitrage free price at time  $n \leq N$ , and  $\Delta_n$  be the number of shares in the replicating portfolio. What is an algorithm to find  $X_n$ ,  $\Delta_n$  for all  $n \leq N$ ? How much is the computational time?

Comptational cost  $\approx 0$  (# elects in  $\Omega$ ) =  $0(2^N)$ 

$$= O(2^{10})$$

$$2^{(0)} 2u = 1024 \approx 10^{3} \implies 2^{0} = (2^{10})^{\frac{1}{2}} \approx 10^{27}$$
Say can comple  $O(10^{9})$  objections in one second.

Completion time  $\approx O(10^{18})$  seconds.

Life of minute  $\approx 10^{19}$  seconds.

**Theorem 6.15.** Suppose a security pays  $V_N = g(S_N)$  at maturity N for some (non-random) function g. Then the arbitrage free price at time  $n \le N$  is given by  $V_n = f_n(S_n)$ , where:

$$(1) \ f_{\underline{N}}(x) = \underline{g(x)} \ for \ x \in \overline{\text{Range}}(S_{\underline{N}}).$$

$$(2) \ f_{\underline{n}}(x) = \underline{\frac{1}{1+r}}(\tilde{p}f_{n+1}(ux) + \tilde{q}f_{n+1}(dx)) \ for \ \underline{x} \in \overline{\text{Range}}(S_{\underline{n}}).$$

Remark 6.16. Reduces the computational time from  $O(2^N)$  to  $O(\sum_{i=0}^{N} |\text{Range}(S_n)|) = O(N^2)$  for the Binomial model.

Remark 6.17. Can solve this to get 
$$\underbrace{f_n(x) = \frac{1}{(1+r)\underbrace{N-n}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-n} \binom{N-n}{k} \underbrace{\tilde{p}^k \tilde{q}^{N-n-k} f_N(x\underline{u}^k}_{\underline{l}} \underbrace{d^{N-n-k})}_{\underline{l}}}_{\underline{l}}$$

Note: Rage 
$$S_1 = \{uS_0, dS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0, dS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0, dS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0, dS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0, udS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0, udS_0\} = \{uS_0, udS_0\} =$$

Throw 
$$\xi_{N}(x) = g(x)$$
  $x \in Raye(S_{N})$   
 $\exists \int_{N-1} (a) = \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \int_{N} (ux) \hat{p} + \int_{N} (dx) \hat{q} \right) \times \mathcal{E} Raye(S_{N-1})$   
 $\exists \int_{N-2} (x) = \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \int_{N-1} (ux) \hat{p} + \int_{N-1} (dx) \hat{q} \right) + \int_{N-1} (dx) \hat{q} + \int_{N} (ux) \hat{q} + \int$ 

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{3}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{3}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{3}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{3}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{3}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2+2\frac{1}{5}\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}n^2\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{(1+n^2)^2}\left(\frac{1}{5}N(n^2x)\frac{1}{5}N(n^2$$

1) Let 
$$f_N(x) = g(x)$$
.  $\Rightarrow f_N(S_N) = g(S_N) = V_N$ .

2) Let  $f_N(x) = g(x)$ .  $\Rightarrow f_N(S_N) = g(S_N) = V_N$ .

Where  $f_N(x) = f_N(x) = f_N(S_N) = f_N(S_N)$ 

Where  $f_N(x) = f_N(x) = f_N(S_N) = f_N(S_N)$ 

Let 
$$X_n = AFP$$
 at time  $n$ .

$$K_{nors} \qquad X_n = \frac{1}{D_n} \stackrel{\sim}{E}_n \left( D_N V_N \right)$$

Since  $n = N-1 \implies X_n = \frac{1}{1+r} \stackrel{\sim}{E}_n \left( \frac{1}{S_{n+1}} \left( \frac{S_{n+1}}{S_{n+1}} \right) \right)$ 

$$= \frac{1}{1+r} \stackrel{\sim}{E}_n \left( \frac{1}{S_n} \left( \frac{S_n}{S_n} \right) \right) \quad \text{where } Y_n = \begin{pmatrix} n & w_{n+1} = 1 \\ n & w_{n+1} = 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $x_n = x_n = x_n$  and  $x_n = x_n = x_n = x_n$  and  $x_n = x_n = x_n = x_n = x_n$ 

indepulse line 1

The 
$$\left( \overrightarrow{f} \right) = \left( S_{n} \cdot n \right) + \left( S_{n} \cdot$$

Let 
$$d_{n}(x) = \frac{1}{4\pi} \left( 7 d_{n+1}(x n) + 7 d_{n+1}(x d) \right) = \chi_{n} = d_{n}(S_{n})$$

U

BED.

Above were for 
$$N = N - 1$$
.

In genal: Bould word indition

(1) Subjecte  $X_{n+1} = AFP$  of true  $n+1 = b_{n+1}(S_{n+1})$ .

(2)  $AFP$  of time  $M$ :  $X_{n} = \frac{1}{D_{n}} \sum_{n} \sum_{n}$ 

(some version as) I the ( some of the sound =  $\{n(S_m), klune \}$ Abon algarilm works to price any security that is a fundamental that is a fundamental that is a fundamental security that is

**Question 6.18.** How do we handle other securities? E.g., Asian options (of the form  $g(\sum_{0}^{N} S_{k})$ )? Eg: Asjan call offin stuke K & nortuty N. last diatly we alone alg to price Asian appliance but is law if we expend the state process.

**Definition 6.24.** We say a d-dimensional process  $Y = (Y^1, \dots, Y^d)$  process is a state process if for any security with maturity  $m \leq N$ , and payoff of the form  $V_m = f_m(Y_m)$  for some (non-random) function  $f_m$ , the arbitrage free price must also be of the form  $V_n = f_n(Y_n)$ for some (non-random) function  $f_n$ . Remark 6.25. For state processes given  $f_N$ , we find  $f_n$  by backward induction. The number of computations at time n is of order


Range $(Y_n)$ .

Remark 6.26. The fact that  $S_n$  is Markov (under  $\tilde{P}$ ) implies that it is a state process.

Lecture 16 (10/8). Please enable your video if you can.

hat the : D AFP famous: 
$$V_{u} = \int_{D_{u}}^{\infty} (D_{u}V_{u}) = \int_{A}^{\infty} (D_{u}V_{u}) = \int_{A}^{\infty$$

Example 6.19 (Knockout options). An up and out call option with strike K and barrier U and maturity N gives the holder the option (not obligation) to buy the stock at price K at maturity time N, provided the stock price has never exceeded the barrier U. If the stock price exceeds the barrier U before maturity, the option is worthless. Find an efficient algorithm to price this option.



Payall of after i Let MN = max Sn N = M = N  $M_{AI} \leq V$ VN = Pagaff of the up & out aftion  $V_{N} = \frac{1}{\{M_{N} \leq u\}} (S_{N} - K)$ (Notation: If A C SL, define 1 to be the rouden variable, like

takes value 1 on the event A 2 D outside A. WEA i.e  $A(\omega) = \begin{cases} 1 & \omega \in A \\ 0 & \omega \notin A \end{cases}$  $\Rightarrow 1$   $\{M_N \leq U\}$   $(S_N - K)^{\dagger} = \begin{cases} (S_N - K)^{\dagger} \\ 0 \end{cases}$ on { M < u} on { M < M}

Idea: Let 
$$M_n = \max_{k \in \mathbb{N}} S_k$$
. ( $M_n$  is an adapted proof)

Hope  $V_n = \int_{\mathbb{N}} (M_n S_n) dx$  find a nearest relation for  $M_n$ .

Ly  $\mathbb{O}$  know for  $M_n = \mathbb{N}$ ,  $V_n = \int_{\mathbb{N}} (M_n S_n)$ 

L) () Know for M = N,  $V_N = \int_N (M_N S_N)$ Where  $\int_N (M_N S) = \int_N (S - K)^{\frac{1}{2}} M \leq M$ Where  $\int_N (M_N S) = \int_N (M_N S_N) M \leq M$ 

Backward indution: Suppose for time 
$$n+1$$
, we know  $V_{n+1} = \begin{cases} V_{n+1} & V_{n+1} \\ V_{n+1} & V_{n+1} \end{cases}$ 
Went  $V_n = \begin{cases} V_n & V_n \\ V_n & V_n \end{cases}$  for some  $\begin{cases} V_n & V_n \\ V_n & V_n \end{cases}$ 


Knows 
$$V_{n} = \frac{1}{D_{n}} \sum_{n} \left( \frac{D_{n+1}}{V_{n+1}} \right) = \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{n} V_{n+1}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{n} \left( \frac{M_{n+1}}{M_{n+1}} \right) S_{n+1}$$

To find by usule May 2 Sun in tens of Mn 2 Sn.

Suff = { uSun wut = 1 } = Suff = Xuti Sn what = { d way = 1 } d wat = 1 } 

Mart = { max 
$$\{M_n, uS_n\}$$
 if  $w_{ut1} = +1$ 



$$V_{n} = \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \frac{1}{r} \left\{ \frac{1}{r} \left( \frac{1}{r} \left($$

**Definition 6.20.** We say a <u>d-dimensional process</u>  $Y = (Y^1, \dots, Y^d)$  process is a <u>state process</u> if for any security with maturity  $\underline{m} \leq N$ , and payoff of the form  $V_m = f_m(Y_m)$  for some (non-random) function  $f_m$ , the arbitrage free price must also be of the form  $V_m = f_m(Y_n)$  for some (non-random) function  $f_n$ .

Remark 6.21. For state processes given  $f_N$ , we typically find  $f_n$  by backward induction. The number of computations at time n is of order Range $(Y_n)$ .

Remark 6.22. The fact that  $S_n$  is Markov (under  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}$ ) implies that it is a state process.

E.g. 
$$Y_n = (S_n)$$
 is a state puece.

Eg:  $M_n = \max_{k \le n} S_k$  2 set  $Y_n' = M_{nn}$   $Y = (Y', Y^2)$ 
 $Y_n' = S_n$ 
 $Y_n' = S_$ 

Lecture 17 (10/11). Please enable video if you can  $\mathbb{O}$   $V_{N} = \frac{1}{D} \widetilde{\mathcal{E}}_{N} \left( D_{N} V_{N} \right) \geq - \text{folies } \mathcal{O}(2^{N}) \text{ time to compile.}$ (2)  $f(x) = g(S_N),$   $f(x) = \frac{1}{1+r} \left( f(x) + \frac{1}{9} f_{n+1}(dx) \right)$  $V_n = \{(S_n) = \text{tokes } O(N) \text{ the to comple} \}$ (3) If I is not in this form (Eg. Knockent oftimes), find fast algorithms

**Definition 6.20.** We say a d-dimensional process  $Y = (Y^1, \ldots, Y^d)$  process is a <u>state process</u> if for any security with maturity  $m \leq N$ , and payoff of the form  $V_m = f_m(Y_m)$  for some (non-random) function  $f_m$ , the arbitrage free price must also be of the form  $V_n = f_n(Y_n)$  for some (non-random) function  $f_n$ .

Remark 6.21. For state processes given  $f_N$ , we typically find  $f_n$  by backward induction. The number of computations at time n is of order Range $(Y_n)$ .

Remark 6.22. The fact that  $S_n$  is Markov (under  $\tilde{P}$ ) implies that it is a state process.

Remark 6.22. The fact that  $S_n$  is Markov (under  $\tilde{P}$ ) implies that it is a state process. State process.

Convolution:

Superscript — coordinate State than AFP is also state.

Superscript — time.

**Theorem 6.23.** Let  $Y = (Y^1, \ldots, Y^d)$  be a d-dimensional process. Suppose we can find functions  $g_1, \ldots, g_N$  such that  $Y_{n+1}(\omega) = (Y^n, \ldots, Y^n)$  $g_{n+1}(Y_n(\omega), \omega_{n+1})$ . Then Y is a state process. OP of thim: Consider a see. That trays (N) of time N. NTS Y M < N, AFP at time M is some for of Ym. (2) Say AFP of fine M+1 is  $\{u_{+1}, v_{+1}\}$ . [Ime for u = N-1] NTC AFP of time on is  $\xi_n(Y_n)$  for some for  $\xi_n$  that I

Know AFP at time 
$$n = V_n = \frac{1}{1+r} E_n V_{n+1}$$

$$\Rightarrow V_n = \frac{1}{1+r} E_n \delta_{n+1} \left( \frac{V_{n+1}}{N+1} \right) = \frac{1}{1+r} E_n \delta_{n+1} \left( \frac{V_n}{N}, \frac{W_{n+1}}{N} \right)$$

indep time  $\frac{1}{1+r} \left( \frac{V_n}{N}, \frac{V_n}{N} \right) + \frac{V_n}{N} \delta_{n+1} \left( \frac{V_n}{N}, \frac{V_n}{N} \right)$ 

$$+ \frac{V_n}{V_n} \left( \frac{V_n}{N}, \frac{V_n}{N} \right) + \frac{V_n}{V_n} \left( \frac{V_n}{N}, \frac{V_n}{N} \right)$$

n  $\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{y}{y} \right) = \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \frac{y}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{y}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \right) \\
+ \frac{y}{y} \left( \frac{y}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{y}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \right) \right)$ > Vn = In (Yn) Whene Note: Gives a recover nel to find for in toung of but ]

# complation:  $\approx O(Rosse(Y_n))$ 

Question 6.24. Is  $Y_n = S_n$  a state process?

Question 6.25. Is  $Y_n = \max_{k \le n} S_n$  a state process?

Question 6.26. Is  $Y_n = (S_n, \max_{k \le n} S_n)$  a state process? Mn = max Sk. -> state frage? - NO Lo To church this is a state press only need to write My ac some for of You & Worth

Note 
$$Y'_{n+1} = S_{n+1} = S_{n} = S_{n} \left( u \cdot 1 \right) \times 1 + d \cdot 1 \times 1 = -1$$

$$= Y'_{n} \left( u \cdot 1 \right) \times 1 + d \cdot 1 \times 1 = -1$$

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$$= X'_{n} \left( u \cdot 1 \right)$$

 $M = \max_{k \in n+1} S_k = \max_{k \in n+1}$ Max Max ) Ken  $= \max \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n} \right) \right)$ 

Question 6.27. Let 
$$A_n = \sum_{0}^{n} S_k$$
. Is  $A_n$  a state process?  $\nearrow$  Question 6.28. Is  $Y_n = (S_n, A_n)$  a state process?


$$S_0 = 1$$
 $Range(S_1) = \{u, d\}$ 
 $Raye(A_1) = \{1+u, 1+d\}$ 
 $Raye(S_2) = \{u^2, ud, d^2\}$ 
 $Raye(A_2) = \{1+u+u^2, 1+u+u^2\}$ 
 $1+d+ud, 1+d+d^2\}$ 

$$Rge(A_z) = e vers$$

## 6.3. Options with random maturity. Consider the N period binomial model with 0 < d < 1 + r < u.

Example 6.29 (Up-and-rebate option). Let A, U > 0. The up-and-rebate option pays the face value A at the first time the stock price exceeds U (up to maturity time N), and nothing otherwise. Explicitly, let  $\tau = \min\{n \leqslant N \mid S_n \geqslant U\}$ , and let  $\sigma = \tau \land N$ . The up-and-rebate options pays  $A1_{\tau \leqslant N}$  at the random time  $\sigma$ .

Remark 6.30. By convention  $\min \emptyset = \infty$ .



## **Definition 6.31.** We say a random variable $\tau$ is a stopping time if:

(1)  $\tau: \Omega \to \{0, \dots, N\} \cup \infty$ (2) For all  $n \leq N$ , the event  $\{\tau \leq n\} \in \mathcal{F}_n$ .

Remark 6.32. We say  $\tau$  is a finite stopping time if  $\tau < \infty$  almost surely.

Remark 6.33. The second condition above is equivalent to requiring  $\{\tau = n\} \in \mathcal{F}_n$  for all n.


Lecture 18 (10/13). Please enable your video if you can

Notation: 
$$a \wedge b = \min \{a, b\}$$
  
 $a \vee b = \max \{a, b\}$ 

6.3. Options with random maturity. Consider the N period binomial model with 0 < d < 1 + r < u

Example 6.29 (Up-and-rebate option). Let  $\underline{A}, \underline{U} > 0$ . The up-and-rebate option pays the face value A at the first time the stock price exceeds U (up to maturity time N), and nothing otherwise. Explicitly, let  $\underline{\tau} = \min\{n \leqslant N \mid S_n \geqslant U\}$ , and let  $\underline{\sigma} = \underline{\tau} \wedge N$ . The up-and-rebate options pays  $A\mathbf{1}_{\tau \leqslant N}$  at the random time  $\sigma$ .

Remark 6.30. By convention  $\min \emptyset = \infty$ .



**Definition 6.31.** We say a random variable  $\underline{\tau}$  is a *stopping time* if:


 $(1) \quad \tau : \Omega \to \{0, \dots, N\} \cup \{\infty\}$   $(2) \text{ For all } n \leqslant N, \text{ the event } \{\tau \leqslant n\} \in \mathcal{F}_n.$ 


Remark 6.32. We say  $\tau$  is a finite stopping time if  $\tau < \infty$  almost surely.

Remark 6.33. The second condition above is equivalent to requiring  $\{\underline{\tau} = n\} \in \mathcal{F}_n$  for all n.

T -> au timo be deside to stap playing a give { t = n } -> event be decided to stap playing at time m.

Regime { t = n } E & (any uses first m coin to sees).





Question 6.37. If  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$  are stopping times, is  $\sigma \wedge \tau$  a stopping time? How about  $\sigma \vee \tau$ ?

Where  $\tau$  is  $\tau$ .

min { T, T}

- Let G be an adapted process, and σ be a finite stopping time.
  Consider a derivative security that pays G<sub>σ</sub> at the random time σ.
- Note  $G_{\sigma} = \sum_{n=0}^{N} G_{n} \mathbf{1}_{\sigma=n}$  (  $G_{\sigma} = G_{n}$  ) be a self-financing portfolio, and  $G_{\sigma} = G_{n}$  ).
   Let  $(X_{0}, (\Delta_{n}))$  be a self-financing portfolio, and  $G_{\sigma} = G_{n}$  ).
- **Definition 6.38.** A self-financing portfolio with wealth process X is a replicating strategy if  $X_{\sigma} = G_{\sigma}$ .

**Theorem 6.39.** The security with payoff  $G_{\sigma}$  (at the stopping time  $\sigma$ ) can be replicated. The arbitrage free price is given by  $X_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}_n(D_{\sigma} G_{\sigma} \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}})}{D_n}$ 

$$X_{n}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma\geqslant n\}} = \frac{V_{1}}{D_{n}}\tilde{E}_{n}(\underline{D}_{\sigma}\underline{G}_{\sigma}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma\geqslant n\}})$$

Remark 6.40. The only thing required for the proof of Theorem 6.39 is the fact that  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio if and only if  $D_n X_n$  is a  $\boldsymbol{P}$  martingale.

Proof: Let 
$$Z = D_F G_F$$
 (some R.V.)

Let  $X_N = \frac{1}{D_N} E_N(Z) = \frac{1}{D_N} E_N(D_F G_F)$ 

Claim D Xn is the wealth of a set finaing soutfalio. > X is a replication of folio of the ( Note: Claim () + (2) secuty with foyof 6, at time T. => AFP of searly at time M & T is Xm. Note  $1 \times 1 = 1 \times 1 =$ 

Note 
$$\{\tau = n\} \in \xi_n$$
  
sine  $\tau$  is a sloper time
$$= \int_{n}^{\infty} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{n$$

Figh to show 
$$D_n X_n = \text{Nealth}$$
 of self for fact

Fright to show  $D_n X_n \cdot \text{is a} = P$  mg

But  $D_n X_n = E_n Z = E_n (D_n G_n)$ 
 $E_n (D_{n+1} X_{n+1}) = E_n (E_{n+1} (D_n G_n)) = E_n (D_n G_n) = D_n X_n$ 

DED.

Lecture 19 (10/15). Please enable your video if you can.

had sine i Ob Stopping time: flag a game. Stop at time I. (random) Need ET = MZ E & (only def on 1st n coin to 495) stop of time n Def: T is a stapping time if () T'SL -> {0,1, -- N} U { 60} 2 2 Novel { t= n3 E & H n. (Note: 2 = (2): New  $\{ \tau \leq n \} \in \mathcal{E}_n \ \forall n \}$ .

- Let G be an adapted process, and  $\sigma$  be a *finite* stopping time.
- Note  $G_{\sigma} = \sum_{n=0}^{N} G_n \mathbf{1}_{\sigma=n}$ .
- Let  $(X_0, (\Delta_n))$  be a self-financing portfolio, and  $X_n$  at time n be the wealth of this portfolio at time n.

**Definition 6.38.** Consider a derivative security that pays  $G_{\underline{\sigma}}$  at the random time  $\underline{\underline{\sigma}}$ . A self-financing portfolio with wealth process  $\underline{\underline{X}}$  is a replicating strategy if  $X_{\underline{\sigma}} = G_{\underline{\sigma}}$ .

Remark 6.39. If a replicating strategy exists, then at any time before  $\sigma$ , the wealth of the replicating strategy must equal the arbitrage free price V. That is,  $\mathbf{1}_{\{n\leqslant\sigma\}}\underbrace{X_n}=\mathbf{1}_{\{n\leqslant\sigma\}}\underbrace{V_n}$ .

**Theorem 6.40.** The security with payoff  $G_{\sigma}$  (at the stopping time  $\sigma$ ) can be replicated. The arbitrage free price is given by

 $V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n(D_\sigma G_\sigma \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}})$ Remark 6.41. The only thing required for the proof of Theorem 6.40 is the fact that  $X_n$  is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio if and only if  $D_n X_n$  is a  $\tilde{P}$  martingale.

Note  $\{\tau \geq n\} \in \mathcal{E}_{n} \Rightarrow 1$  is  $\mathcal{E}_{n} - \text{meas}$   $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{n} \left( 1 + \mathbb{E}_{n} \times \mathbb{E}_{n} \right) = 1 + \mathbb{E}_{n} \left( \mathbb{E}_{n} \times \mathbb{E}_{n} \right)$ 

Note  $\xi \tau = n \cdot \xi \in \xi_n$ . (i.e.  $\tau$  is a staffing time)  $\xi \tau \leq n \cdot \xi \in \xi_n \qquad (\forall ee: \xi \tau \leq n \cdot \xi = 0) \quad \exists \tau = k \cdot \xi \in \eta$  $\{r>n\}=\{r\leqslant n\}$ 

Also Er>ule &

 $\mathbb{F}_{n} = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{F}_{n} \left( \mathbb{F}_{n} + \mathbb{F}_{n} \right)$ 

= formula pe varied to prome. Plot doin 1: X is wealth of a self for fact

DuXn is a P mg fouls for X<sub>U+1</sub> Only NTS Dn Xn is a P mg. Compute  $\widehat{E}_{n}(D_{n+1}X_{n+1}) = \widehat{E}_{n} D_{n+1} \widehat{E}_{n+1}(D_{\sigma}G_{\sigma}) \cdot L$ towa  $\mathcal{E}_{n}(\mathcal{D}_{G}G_{T}) = \mathcal{D}_{n} \times_{n}$  (faula for  $\ell_{n}$ )

$$\begin{cases} \begin{cases} \text{Claim } 2 \end{cases} & \text{NTS} \end{cases} X = G_{+}$$

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$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{n$$

**Proposition 6.42.** The wealth of the replicating portfolio (at times before  $\sigma$ ) is uniquely determined by the recurrence relations:

 $\tilde{E}_n X_{n+1}(\omega) = \tilde{E}_n X_{n+1}(\omega') = \tilde{p} X_{n+1}(\omega', 1) + \tilde{q} X_{n+1}(\omega', -1)$ .

$$\frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma>n\}} \tilde{E}_n X_{n+1}}$$

$$X_{N}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma=N\}} = G_{N}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma=N\}}$$

$$X_{n}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma\geqslant n\}} = G_{n}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma=n\}} + \frac{1}{1+r}\mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma>n\}}\tilde{E}_{n}X_{n+1}.$$
If we write  $\omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega'')$  with  $\omega' = (\omega_{1}, \dots, \omega_{n})$ , then we know in the Binomial model we have

As before, we will use state processes to find practical algorithms to price securities. Example 6.43. Let A, U > 0. The up-and-rebate option pays the face value A at the first time the stock price exceeds U (up to maturity

Example 6.43. Let A, U > 0. The up-and-rebate option pays the face value A at the first time the stock price exceeds U (up to maturity time N), and nothing otherwise. Find an efficient way to compute the arbitrage free price of this option.

**Proposition 6.44.** Let  $Y = (Y^1, \ldots, Y^d)$  be a d-dimensional process such that for every n we have  $Y_{n+1}(\omega) = h_{n+1}(Y_n(\omega), \omega_{n+1})$  for some deterministic function  $h_{n+1}$ . Let  $A_1, \ldots, A_N \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ , with  $A_N \mathbb{R}^d$ , and define the stopping time  $\sigma$  by  $\sigma = \min\{n \in \{0, \dots, N\} \mid Y_n \in A_n\}.$ 


Let  $g_0, \ldots g_N$  be N deterministic functions on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , and consider a security that pays  $G_{\sigma} = g_{\sigma}(Y_{\sigma})$ . The arbitrage free price of this security is of the form  $V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = f_n(Y_n) \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}}$ . The functions  $f_n$  satisfy the recurrence relation

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$$f_N(y) = g_N(y)$$

$$f_n(y) = \mathbf{1}_{\{y \in A_n\}} g_n(y) + \frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{y \notin A_n\}}}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,1)) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,-1)) \right)$$

6.4. **Optional Sampling.** Consider a market with a few risky assets and a bank.

**Question 6.45.** If there is no arbitrage opportunity at time N, can there be arbitrage opportunities at time  $n \leq N$ ? How about at finite stopping times?



Question 6.47. Say M is a martingale. We know  $\mathbf{E}M_n = \mathbf{E}M_0$  for all n. Is this also true for stopping times?

**Theorem 6.48** (Doob's optional sampling theorem). Let  $\tau$  be a bounded stopping time and M be a martingale. Then  $\mathbf{E}_n M_{\tau} = M_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

**Proposition 6.49.** Suppose a market admits a risk neutral measure. If X is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio and  $\tau$  is a finite stopping time such that  $X_0 = 0$ , and  $X_{\tau} \ge 0$ , then  $X_{\tau} = 0$ .

Remark 6.50. This is simply an alternate proof of Proposition 6.46.

Question 6.51 (Gamblers ruin). Suppose  $N = \infty$ . Let  $X_n$  be i.i.d. random variables with mean 0, and let  $S_n = \sum_{1}^{n} X_k$ . Let  $\tau = \min\{n \mid S_n = 1\}$ . (It is known that  $\tau < \infty$  almost surely.) What is  $\mathbf{E}S_{\tau}$ ? What is  $\lim_{N\to\infty} \mathbf{E}S_{\tau\wedge N}$ ?

6.5. American Options. An American option is an option that can be exercised at any time chosen by the holder.

**Definition 6.52.** Let  $G_0, G_1, \ldots, G_N$  be an adapted process. An American option with intrinsic value G is a security that pays  $G_{\sigma}$  at any finite stopping time  $\sigma$  chosen by the holder.

Example 6.53. An American put with strike K is an American option with intrinsic value  $(K - S_n)^+$ .

Question 6.54. How do we price an American option? How do we decide when to exercise it? What does it mean to replicate it?

Lecture 20 (10/18). Please enable your video if you can.



/

• Let G be an adapted process, and  $\sigma$  be a *finite* stopping time.

• Note  $G_{\sigma} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} G_n \mathbf{1}_{\sigma=n}$ .

• Let  $(X_0,(\Delta_n))$  be a self-financing portfolio, and  $X_n$  at time n be the wealth of this portfolio at time n.

**Definition 6.38.** Consider a derivative security that pays  $G_{\sigma}$  at the random time  $\sigma$ . A self-financing portfolio with wealth process X is a replicating strategy if  $X_{\sigma} = G_{\sigma}$ .

Remark 6.39. If a replicating strategy exists, then at any time before  $\sigma$ , the wealth of the replicating strategy must equal the arbitrage free price V. That is,  $\mathbf{1}_{\{n \leq \sigma\}} X_n = \mathbf{1}_{\{n \leq \sigma\}} V_n$ .

**Theorem 6.40.** The security with payoff  $G_{\sigma}$  (at the stopping time  $\sigma$ ) can be replicated. The arbitrage free price is given by

$$\underbrace{V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n(D_\sigma G_\sigma \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}})}_{Remark \ 6.41. \ \text{The only thing required for the proof of Theorem } 6.40 \text{ is the fact that } X_n \text{ is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio if and } 1 \text{ if } D \text{ } Y \text{ is } \tilde{D} \text{ } Y \text{ is } \tilde{D} \text{ } Y \text{ is } \tilde{D} \text{ } Y \text{ } Y$$

only if  $D_n X_n$  is a  $\boldsymbol{P}$  martingale.

**Proposition 6.42.** The wealth of the replicating portfolio (at times before  $\sigma$ ) is uniquely determined by the recurrence relations:

with 
$$\omega' = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n)$$
, then we know in the Binomial model we have

If we write  $\omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega'')$  with  $\omega' = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n)$ , then we know in the Binomial model we have  $\tilde{E}_n X_{n+1}(\omega) = \tilde{E}_n X_{n+1}(\omega') = \tilde{p} X_{n+1}(\omega', 1) + \tilde{q} X_{n+1}(\omega', -1)$ .

Real 
$$X_n = \text{weath}$$
 of ref fout  $= AFP = V_n$ 

Plocation  $X_n = \text{weath}$  is self for  $X_n = V_n$ 

The self fout is  $X_n = V_n$ 

The self for  $X_$ 

$$=\frac{1}{4\pi}\left(\frac{2}{4\pi}\sum_{n}X_{n+1}\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{4\pi}\left(\frac{2}{4\pi}\sum_{n}X_{n+1}\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{4\pi}\left(\frac{2}{4\pi}\sum_{n}X_{n+1}\right)$$

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$$=\frac{1}{4\pi}\left(\frac{2}{4\pi}\sum_{n}X_{n}\right)$$

$$=\frac{1}{4\pi}\left(\frac{2}{4\pi}\sum_{$$


$$= \frac{1}{2\pi n} \left( \frac{1}{2\pi n} \right) + \frac{$$

As before, we will use state processes to find practical algorithms to price securities.

Example 6.43. Let A, U > 0. The up-and-rebate option pays the face value A at the first time the stock price exceeds U (up to maturity time N), and nothing otherwise. Find an efficient way to compute the arbitrage free price of this option.

Say 
$$d=\frac{1}{n}$$
,  $S_0=1$ ,  $U=uS_0=u$ ,  $N=3$ 





They some example: Rut hook for  $\frac{1}{2n \le \sqrt{2}} = \frac{1}{2n \ge \sqrt{2}$ 

(2) Son 
$$1$$
{ $v > m$ }  $1$ 0 $v > m$ 0

$$=\frac{1}{\{v \geq u\}}\left(A \stackrel{!}{=} \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \geq u\}} + \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \geq u\}} + \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} \stackrel{!}{=} \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} \stackrel{!}{=} \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} + \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} \left(\frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} + \frac{1}{\{S_{u} \leq u\}} + \frac{1}{\{$$

**Proposition 6.44.** Let  $Y = (Y^1, \ldots, Y^d)$  be a d-dimensional process such that for every n we have  $Y_{n+1}(\omega) = h_{n+1}(Y_n(\omega), \omega_{n+1})$  for some deterministic function  $h_{n+1}$ . Let  $A_1, \ldots, A_N \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ , with  $A_N \mathbb{R}^d$ , and define the stopping time  $\sigma$  by  $\sigma = \min\{n \in \{0, \dots, N\} \mid Y_n \in A_n\}.$ 

Let  $g_0, \ldots g_N$  be N deterministic functions on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , and consider a security that pays  $G_{\sigma} = g_{\sigma}(Y_{\sigma})$ . The arbitrage free price of this security is of the form  $V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = f_n(Y_n) \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}}$ . The functions  $f_n$  satisfy the recurrence relation

 $f_N(y) = g_N(y)$ 

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$$f_N(y) = g_N(y)$$

$$f_n(y) = \mathbf{1}_{\{y \in A_n\}} g_n(y) + \frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{y \notin A_n\}}}{1 + r} \Big( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, 1)) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, -1)) \Big)$$

## Lecture 21 (10/20). Please enable video if you can

Up retale retion: pays face value A
the first time state fine exceeds !! Found The AFP as  $\frac{1}{2} \left\{ x \leq T \right\} = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ x \leq T \right\}$ 

I found a neurose relation for  $t = hime of him page / expires = (min & k \le N \ S_k \rightarrow U\lambda) \tau N$ 

**Proposition 6.44.** Let  $Y = (Y^1, \ldots, Y^d)$  be a d-dimensional process such that for every n we have  $Y_{n+1}(\omega) = h_{n+1}(Y_n(\omega), \omega_{n+1})$  for some deterministic function  $h_{n+1}$ . Let  $\overline{A}_1, \ldots, A_N \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ , with  $A_N \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ , and define the stopping time  $\sigma$  by  $\sigma = \min\{n \in \{0, \dots, N\} \mid Y_n \in A_n\}.$ Let  $g_0, \ldots g_N$  be N deterministic functions on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , and consider a security that pays  $G_{\sigma} = g_{\sigma}(Y_{\sigma})$ . The arbitrage free price of this security is of the form  $V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = f_n(Y_n) \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}}$ . The functions  $f_n$  satisfy the recurrence relation  $f_N(y) = g_N(y)$  $f_n(y) = \mathbf{1}_{\{\underline{y} \in \underline{A_n}\}} g_n(y) + \frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{y \notin A_n\}}}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,\underline{1})) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,\underline{-1})) \right)$ 

Let 
$$g_0, \ldots g_N$$
 be  $N$  deterministic functions on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , and consider a security that pays  $G_\sigma = g_\sigma(Y_\sigma)$ . The arbitrage free price of this security of the form  $V_n \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}} = f_n(Y_n) \mathbf{1}_{\{\sigma \geqslant n\}}$ . The functions  $f_n$  satisfy the recurrence relation 
$$f_N(y) = g_N(y)$$

$$f_n(y) = \mathbf{1}_{\{y \in A_n\}} g_n(y) + \frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{y \notin A_n\}}}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,1)) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y,-1)) \right)$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{Supersum} \\ \text{Supersum} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{Supersum} \\ \text{Supersum} \end{cases}$$

## 6.4. Optional Sampling.

**Theorem 6.45** (Doob's optional sampling theorem). Let  $\underline{\tau}$  be a bounded stopping time and  $\underline{\underline{M}}$  be a martingale. Then  $\underline{\underline{E}_n \underline{M}_{\tau}} = \underline{M}_{\underline{\tau} \wedge n}$ .

Remark 6.46. When dealing with finitely many coin tosses  $(N \le \infty)$ , bounded stopping times are the same as finite stopping times. When dealing with infinitely many coin tosses, the two notions are different.

Remark 6.47. When  $N = \infty$  and  $\tau$  is not bounded, the optional sampling theorem is still true if  $X_{\tau \wedge k}$  is uniformly bounded in k.

Corollary 6.48. If M is a martingale and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time, then  $EM_{\tau} = EM_0$ .

Note: Fix 
$$T = n+1$$
 (is a storping time)
$$E_n M_T = E_n M_{n+1} = M_n \left( de \left\{ \begin{array}{c} d \\ e \\ \end{array} \right\} M_g \right)$$

$$||OST|$$

M is a mg . - Jain game  $\Rightarrow$  EM<sub>n</sub> = EM<sub>0</sub> = M<sub>0</sub> ("M<sub>0</sub> is not various). De Say we a stop playing at some bad stopping time I Ann What is EM? Claim: EM = EM Proal: By OST: (N=0)

EO MINO = EMO (00 Mo is not navolum) Proof of Theorem 6.45 T is a wind stopping free  $(E_{1})$   $(E_{2})$   $(E_{3})$   $(E_{4})$   $(E_{$ F\_ weas

$$= 1 + \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \sum_{k=k}^{\infty} \sum_{k=k}^{\infty} \sum_{k=k}^{\infty} \sum_{k=n}^{\infty} \sum_{k=n}^{\infty$$

$$= 1 + \sum_{k=n+1}^{N} \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2}$$

$$= 1 + E_{n} \left( \frac{1}{5} + \sum_{N} M_{N} \right)$$

$$= 1 + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5$$

## Lecture 22 (10/22). Please enable video if you can

hast time! Dook OST: I > bold starting time? En M(I) = MMAT (Note: For 10) way coin tosses,

OST is time if I is tidd.

If I < 10 a.s., then you typically wed an extra

cound. Consider a market with a few risky assets and a bank.

**Proposition 6.49.** Suppose a market admits a <u>risk neutral measure</u>. If X is the wealth of a self-financing portfolio and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time such that  $X_0 = 0$ , and  $X_{\tau} \geqslant 0$ , then  $X_{\tau} = 0$ . That is, there can be an arbitrage opportunity at any bounded stopping time

(Under a RNM, X self fin 
$$\Rightarrow$$
 D<sub>N</sub>X<sub>n</sub> is a  $\widehat{P}$  mg)

NTS X<sub>T</sub> = 0 a.s. Know D<sub>N</sub>X<sub>n</sub> is a  $\widehat{P}$  mg. (


NTS 
$$X_T = 0$$
 a.s. Know  $D_n X_n$  is a  $\widehat{T}$  my. (self fin).

$$\Rightarrow OST \quad \widehat{E}(D_t X_t) = \widehat{E}_0(D_t X_t) = D_0 X_0 = 0$$

$$\text{Know } D_t X_t > 0 \quad \& \ \widehat{E}(D_t X_t) = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow D_t X_T = 0 \quad \text{a.s.} \Rightarrow X_t = 0 \quad \text{a.s.}$$

QED



() We have is fair! 2) What is EXT? (Xn = wealth at time n) EX = 10<sup>6</sup> (Docs not controllet DST: I med not be bold) (3) Have we besten the Honse.

6.5. American Options. An American option is an option that can be exercised at any time chosen by the holder.

**Definition 6.51.** Let  $G_0, G_1, \ldots, G_N$  be an adapted process. An American option with intrinsic value G is a security that pays  $G_{\sigma}$  at any finite stopping time  $\sigma$  chosen by the holder.

Example 6.52. An American put with strike K is an American option with intrinsic value  $(\underline{K} - S_n)^+$ .

Question 6.53. How do we price an American option? How do we decide when to exercise it? What does it mean to replicate it?

Strategy I: Let  $\underline{\sigma}$  be a finite stopping time, and consider an option with (random) maturity time  $\underline{\sigma}$  and payoff  $\underline{G_{\sigma}}$ . Let  $\underline{V_0^{\sigma}}$  denote the arbitrage free price of this option. The arbitrage free price of the American option should be  $V_0 = \max_{\underline{\sigma}} V_0^{\sigma}$ , where the maximum is taken over all finite stopping times  $\sigma$ .

**Definition 6.54.** The *optimal exercise time* is a stopping time  $\sigma^*$  that maximizes  $V_0^{\sigma^*}$  over all finite stopping times.

**Definition 6.55.** An optimal exercise time  $\underline{\sigma}^*$  is called *minimal* if for every optimal exercise time  $\underline{\tau}^*$  we have  $\underline{\sigma}^* \leq \underline{\tau}^*$ . Remark 6.56. The optimal exercise time need not be unique. (The *minimal* optimal exercise time is certainly unique.)

Vo -> AFP of a aprior that notus at I & pays G. Know American oftion is worth more than any of these oftions. hues: AFP of Amian off = Vo = Max Vo 1

Question 6.57. Does this replicate an American option? Say  $\sigma^*$  is the optimal exercise time, and we create a replicating portfolio (with wealth process X) for the option with payoff  $G_{\sigma^*}$  at time  $\sigma^*$ . Suppose an investor cashes out the American option at time  $\tau$ . Can we pay him?

Strategy II: Replication. Suppose we have sold an American option with intrinsic value G to an investor. Using that, we hedge our position by investing in the market/bank, and let  $X_n$  be the our wealth at time n.

(1) Need  $X_{\sigma} \geqslant G_{\sigma}$  for all finite stopping times  $\sigma$ . (Or equivalently  $X_n \geqslant G_n$  for all n.) (2) For (at-least) one stopping time  $\sigma^*$ , need  $X_{\sigma^*} = G_{\sigma^*}$ .

The arbitrage free price of this option is  $X_0$ .

Sall Amican at for (X) at true O Innest X .- Wealth X n at time n.

## Lecture 23 (10/25). Please enable your video if you can.

American office -> Intrinsic value G Exercise of any stopping time of your choice) allet into value, Go Strotegy I: Have an averien aftion.

Recell it as an aftion with fixed (random) materity time I & fayoff Go AFP is Vo

Price American aftion by selling to highest bidderi.e.  $V_0 = \max_{\tau} V_0^{\tau}$  over all finte stating times  $\tau$ .  $V_0 = V_0^{T_X} = \max_{T} V_0^{T}$ Let I be a stapping time for which (optimal exercise time). Straton II ? Sell on Amican of to an invector for X \$. invector can carle out at any fine staffing time T.

(1) Need to ensure my wealth  $X_{\tau} > G_{\tau} + \tau$ . (i.e.  $X_{n} > G_{n} + n$  a.s.). (2) Also, for it least one stopping time  $\frac{2}{5}$ , need  $X_{px} = G_{px}$ . Question 6.57. Does Strategy I replicate an American option? Say  $\sigma^*$  is the optimal exercise time, and we create a replicating portfolio (with wealth process X) for the option with payoff  $G_{\sigma^*}$  at time  $\sigma^*$ . Suppose an investor cashes out the American option at time  $\underline{\tau}$ . Can we pay him?

Strategy I docent, tell me how to invest Xo so that we can replicate the American Oftion)

IOV: Voe strat I to replicate.

Question 6.58. Does Strategy II yield the same price as Strategy I? I.e.  $must_{\bullet}X_{0} = \max\{V_{0}^{\sigma} \mid \sigma \text{ is a finite stopping time }\}$ ?

Question 6.59. Is the wealth of the replicating portfolio (for an American option) uniquely determined?

( Not innediately clear )

Question 6.60. How do you find the minimal optimal exercise time, and the arbitrage free price? Let's take a simple example first.

Eq: 
$$w = 2$$
,  $d = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $r = \frac{1}{4}$ 

$$\hat{\nabla} = \frac{1+x-d}{x-d} = \frac{5/4-\frac{1}{2}}{3/2} = \frac{3/4}{3/2} = \frac{3}{2}$$

American put strike 
$$K = 8$$
.  $(W = 3)$ 

Lesh of 
$$\rightarrow 6$$
 (Bollon to ush of!)

Wast  $\rightarrow 4 \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} 7\right) = \frac{2(11)}{5} = \frac{22}{5}$ 

We have  $\rightarrow 24 + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{2}{5} = \frac{2}{5} = \frac{2}{5} = \frac{76}{25}$ 

**Theorem 6.61.** Consider the binomial model with 0 < d < 1 + r < u, and an American option with intrinsic value G. Define

$$V_N = G_N$$
,  $V_n = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{D_n} \tilde{E}_n(D_{n+1}V_{n+1}), G_n \right\}$ ,  $\sigma^* = \min \{ n \leqslant N \mid V_n = G_n \}$ .


Then  $V_n$  is the arbitrage free price, and  $\sigma^*$  is the minimal optimal exercise time. Moreover, this option can be replicated.

Remark 6.62. The above is true in any complete, arbitrage free market.

Remark 6.63. In the Binomial model the above simplifies to:

$$V_n(\omega) = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} V_{n+1}(\omega', \underline{1}) + \tilde{q} V_{n+1}(\omega', \underline{-1}) \right), G_n(\omega) \right\}, \quad \text{where } \omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega''), \quad \omega' = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n).$$

Lecture 24 (10/27): Please enable video if you can



**Theorem 6.61.** Consider the binomial model with 0 < d < 1 + r < u, and an American option with intrinsic value G. Define

$$\underbrace{V_N = G_N}, \qquad \underbrace{V_n = \max\left\{\frac{1}{D_n}\tilde{E}_n(D_{n+1}V_{n+1}), \underline{G_n}\right\}}_{\text{the arbitrage free price, and }\sigma^* \text{ is the minimal optimal exercise time. Moreover, this option can be replicated.}$$

Then  $V_n$  is the arbitrage free price, and  $\sigma^*$  is the minimal optimal exercise time. Moreover, this option can be replicated.

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$$V_n(\omega) = \max \left\{ \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} V_{n+1}(\omega', 1) + \tilde{q} V_{n+1}(\omega', -1) \right), G_n(\omega) \right\}, \quad \text{where } \omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega''), \quad \omega' = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n).$$

Remark 6.64. We will prove Theorem 6.61 in the next section after proving the Doob decomposition.

**Theorem 6.65.** Consider the Binomial model with 
$$0 < d < 1 + r < u$$
, and a state process  $Y = (Y^1, \dots, Y^d)$  such that  $Y_{n+1}(\omega) = h_{n+1}(Y_n(\omega'), \omega_{n+1})$ , where  $\omega' = (\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n)$ ,  $\omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \dots, \omega_N)$ , and  $h_0, h_1, \dots, h_N$  are  $N$  deterministic functions. Let  $g_0, \dots, g_N$  be  $N$  deterministic functions, let  $G_k = g_k(Y_k)$ , and consider an American option with intrinsic value  $G = (G_0, G_1, \dots, G_N)$ . The pre-exercise price of the option at time  $n$  is  $f_n(Y_n)$ , where 
$$f_N(y) = g_N(y) \quad \text{for } y \in \text{Range}(Y_N), \quad f_n(y) = \max \left\{ g_n(y), \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, \omega)) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, \omega)) \right) \right\}, \quad \text{for } y \in \text{Range}(Y_n).$$

$$f_N(y) = g_N(y) \quad \text{for } y \in \text{Range}(Y_N) \,, \quad f_n(y) = \max \left\{ g_n(y), \frac{1}{1+r} \left( \tilde{p} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, \boldsymbol{u})) + \tilde{q} f_{n+1}(h_{n+1}(y, \boldsymbol{u})) \right) \right\}, \quad \text{for } y \in \text{Range}(Y_n) \,.$$

$$The \text{ minimal optimal exercise time is } \sigma^* = \min \left\{ n \mid f_n(Y_n) = g_n(Y_n) \right\}.$$

= max 
$$\{6_N\}$$
  $\frac{1}{14\pi} E_N V_{N+1} \}$ .

(2) Book word indition: Knew  $V_N = G_N = g_N (N)$ .

$$(3) \quad S_{AY} \quad V_{nH} = \int_{N} \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) . \quad NTS \quad V_{n} = \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) .$$

$$K_{nors} \quad V_{n} = \sum_{n} \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) . \quad NTS \quad V_{n} = \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) .$$

$$= \max \left\{ \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) , \quad \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{n} \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n+1} \\ Y_{n+1} \end{array} \right) . \right\} .$$

$$= \max \left\{ \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) , \quad \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{n} \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n+1} \\ Y_{n+1} \end{array} \right) . \right\} .$$

$$= \max \left\{ \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n} \\ Y_{n} \end{array} \right) , \quad \frac{1}{1+r} \sum_{n} \int_{N} \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_{n+1} \\ Y_{n+1} \end{array} \right) . \right\} .$$

Set 
$$f_n(y) = \max_x \left\{ g_n(y), \frac{1}{1+r} \left( f_n f_n(h_{n+1}(y) + 1) + g_n f_n(h_{n+1}(y) - 1) \right) \right\}$$


$$\text{A get } V_n = \int_{\Omega} (Y_n)$$


$$\text{A keo } k_{non} \quad p^* = \min_x \left\{ n \mid V_n = G_n \right\} \quad \text{OED}.$$

= max  $\left\{ \mathcal{G}_{n}\left(\frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}}\right), \frac{1}{1+n^{2}} \left( \frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}} \left(\frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}}\right) + \frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}} \left(\frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}}\right) + \frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}} \left(\frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}}\right) + \frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}} \left(\frac{y_{n}}{x_{n}}\right) \right) \right\}$ 

**Theorem 6.66.** Suppose the interest rate r is nonnegative. Let g be a convex function with g(0) = 0, and let  $G_n = g(S_n)$ . Consider an American option with intrinsic value  $G_n = g(S_n)$ . Then  $\sigma^* = N$  is an optimal exercise time. That is, it is not advantageous to exercise this option early.

Corollary 6.67. The arbitrage free price of an American call and European call are the same.





(4) Know 
$$V_n = \max \left\{ g(S_n), \frac{1}{1+r} E_n V_{n+1} \right\}$$
.

Back rad indular! Suppose  $V_{n+1} \geq g(S_{n+1})$  (Time for  $n+1 = N$ )

$$\begin{array}{lll}
& \geq & \sum_{n} g\left(\frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r}\right) & \left(\frac{S_{n}}{1+r}\right) & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r} \\
& \geq & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r} & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r} \\
& = & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r} & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n}}{1+r} & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n+1}}{1+r} & \leq & \sum_{n} \frac{S_{n}}{1+r} &$$

Toolog; It En Vati > It En g(Sati) = En (Ing(Sati))

Knew Vn = max {g(Sn), itr En Vn+1 } Just should this is > g(Sn) has a better exptid refun than > Holding the oftion loop disays exercize.

## 6.6. Optimal Stopping.

**Definition 6.68.** We say an adapted process M is a super-martingale if  $E_n M_{n+1} \leq M_n$ .

**Definition 6.69.** We say an adapted process M is a *sub-martingale* if  $E_n M_{n+1} \geqslant M_n$ .

Example 6.70. The discounted arbitrage free price of an American option is a super-martingale under the risk neutral measure.

**Theorem 6.71** (Doob decomposition). Any adapted process can be uniquely expressed as the sum of a martingale and a predictable process that starts at 0. That is, if X is an adapted process there exists a unique pair of process M, A such that M is a martingale, A is predictable,  $A_0 = 0$  and X = M + A.

**Proposition 6.72.** If X is a super-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process A such that X = M - A.

**Proposition 6.73.** If X is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process A such that X = M + A.

## Lecture 25 (10/29). Please enable video if you can

Kon Have not yet proved  $V_{n} = \max \left\{ G_{n}, \frac{1}{D_{n}} \mathbb{E}_{n} \left( \overline{D}_{n} \mathbf{n} \, V_{n} \mathbf{n} \right) \right\}$ Fine the AFP of an american often (IOV)

6.6. Optimal Stopping.

**Definition 6.68.** We say an adapted process  $\underline{\underline{M}}$  is a <u>super-martingale</u> if  $\underline{\underline{E}}_n M_{n+1} \leq M_n \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{array} \right)$   $\underbrace{\underline{H}}_n \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{array} \right)$   $\underbrace{\underline{H}}_n \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{array} \right)$   $\underbrace{\underline{H}}_n \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ \end{array} \right)$ 

Example 6.70. The discounted arbitrage free price of an American option is a super-martingale under the risk neutral measure.

is Constant Mg: The fun up EMn is a decreasing in of n Super mg: The for n > EMn is any the fund h. Sub mg: 11 11  $M \longleftrightarrow EM$ (Pf: If Mish swar my;  $E_{N}M_{N+1} \leq M_{N} \Rightarrow E(E_{N}M_{N+1}) \leq EM_{N}$ 

**Theorem 6.71** (Doob decomposition) Any adapted process can be uniquely expressed as the sum of a martingale and a predictable process that starts at 0. That is, if X is an adapted process there exists a unique pair of process M, A such that M is a martingale, A is predictable,  $A_0 = 0$  and X = M + A. Predictable,  $A_0 = 0$ Recal: A is a predictable process if An is Fn\_1-meachable (In finance: Cash in bomb - predictable gracess.) Scrotch work: Say  $X_n = M_n + A_n$   $M_q$   $P_{red}$ ,  $A_0 = 0$ 

$$\Rightarrow X_{M+1} = M_{M+1} + A_{M+1}$$

$$\Rightarrow E_{M} X_{M+1} = E_{M} M_{M+1} + E_{M} A_{M+1}$$

$$E_{M} X_{M+1} = M_{M} + A_{M+1}$$

$$Want A_{0} = 0. \qquad X_{0} = M_{0} + A_{0} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{0} = M_{0}$$

$$X_1 = M_1 + A_1$$
 $E_1 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_2 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_3 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_4 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_5 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_5 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1 - M_0$ 
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 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1$ 
 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1$ 
 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1 = E_1$ 
 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1$ 
 $E_7 = M_0 + A_1$ 

 $\Rightarrow A_2 = E_1 X_2 - M_1$ 

$$X_z = M_g$$

$$X_2 = M_2 + A_2 \Rightarrow E_1 X_2 = M_1 + A_2$$

$$M_2 +$$

Indution: 1) Define  $A_D = 0$  &  $M_0 = X_0$ 

 $C M_{NH} + A_{NH} = M_{N} + M_{NH} - E_{N} M_{NH} + E_{N} M_{NH} - M_{N}$ = Xntl QED. Uniqueness: (Proof donc clas shows migneries sine As & Mo wave migne & the choice of Mnn & Anti that satisfies  $X_{n+1} = M_{n+1} + A_{n+1} \times M \rightarrow m_0$ A  $\rightarrow$  proof is also might OFP Proposition 6.72. If X is a super-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that X = M - M.

Proposition 6.73. If X is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M = M + M.

If M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M such that M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique martingale M and increasing predictable process M is a sub-martingale, then there exists a unique M is a sub-martingale M is a sub

Doo't deconfostion: While  $X = M + \widetilde{A}$  (M is a magnitude)

Set  $A = -\widetilde{A}$ .  $\Rightarrow X = M - \widetilde{A}$ 

NTS: A is inc.;  $X_{n+1} = M_{n+1} - A_{n+1}$ 

W

Canothron an 
$$f_n$$
:  $E_n X_{n+1} = E_n M_{n+1} - E_n A_{n+1}$ 

$$(E_n X_{n+1} \leq X_n) \qquad X_n \geq E_n X_{n+1} = M_n \qquad -A_{n+1}$$

$$X_n = M_n - A_n$$

$$M_n - A_n \geq M_n - A_{n+1} \Rightarrow A_{n+1} \geq A_n$$

$$A_{n+1} = A_n \qquad A_n \geq A_n$$

$$A_n = A_n \leq A_n \qquad A_n \leq A_n$$

$$A_n = A_n \leq A_n \qquad A_n \leq A_n$$

Corollary 6.74. If X is a super-martingale and 
$$\tau$$
 is a bounded stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \leq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Corollary 6.75. If X is a sub-martingale and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: If X is a way & T is a did stopping time time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

The Formattingale and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: If X is a sub-martingale and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: If X is a sub-martingale and  $\tau$  is a bounded stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Recall: OST: A way & T is a did stopping time, then  $E_n X_{\tau} \geq X_{\tau \wedge n}$ .

Pools decomp: While 
$$X = M - A$$

Mg Pred (ma.)


$$\Rightarrow E_{n} X_{t} = E_{n} (M_{t} - A_{t})$$

= Mth - EnAI

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \left( : \circ & T \land u \leq T \\ \Rightarrow & A_{T \land u} \leq A_{T} \right) \\ \left( : \circ & A_{T \land u} \leq A_{T} \right) \\ \left( : \circ & A_{T \land u} \leq A_{T} \right) \end{array}$$

(1 1 b = bemin (a, b?)

 $N = \sum_{k=0}^{N} \frac{1}{4\pi k} + \frac{1}{4\pi n}$   $\int_{k}^{4\pi} \frac{1}{4\pi n} dx$   $\int_{k}^{4\pi} \frac{1}{4\pi n} dx$ Note meacs.



Lecture 26 (11/1). Please enable video if you can.

And three: Super Mg: 
$$M_n \ge E_n M_{n+1}$$
  
Sub Mg:  $M_n \le E_n M_{n+1}$   
Doo't Deamh:  $X = M_n + A_n$  ( $A_{n+1}$  is  $\delta_n$ -meas)  
Mg Producted  $A_0 = 0$   
Car:  $X$  is a super Mg  $\Rightarrow X = M_n - A_n$   
Mg Producted  $A_n = 0$   
Mg Producted  $A_n = 0$ 

**Theorem 6.76** (Snell). Let G be an adapted process, and define V by  $V_N = G_N$   $V_n = \max\{E_n V_{n+1}, \underline{G_n}\}.$ Then V is the smallest super-martingale for which  $V_n \geqslant G_n$ . Can stop playing a game of any finte stopping time or Collect versored Grand Vn > Gn (3) If W is any super Mg + W> 61 then W>V

(2):  $V_n = \max \{ 6_n, E_n V_{n+1} \} \Rightarrow V_n > 6_n$ . D: Vn = max {Gn, En Vn+1 { > Vn > En Vn+1 => Vn is a super mg. Pl of 3: Let W he any show Mg. 7 W>G. NTS W > V

$$\Rightarrow V_{n} \text{ is a cuton mg.}$$

(2) Assume 
$$W_{n+1} > V_{n+1}$$

(a)  $W_n > E_n W_{n+1}$  (: W is a super mg)

$$\geq E_n V_{n+1}$$
 (inelation Hyp)

(b) Already  $K_{n+1} = W_n > G_n$ 

(6) Almedy know Wn > Gn

 $D^{2}D \Rightarrow W_{N} \geqslant \max_{n} \{G_{N}, E_{N}V_{n+1}\} = V_{N} \quad \text{QED}.$ 

**Proposition 6.77.** If W is any martingale for which  $W_n \geqslant G_n$ , and for one stopping time  $\tau^*$  we have  $EW_{\underline{\tau}^*} = EG_{\tau^*}$ , then we must have  $W_{\tau^* \wedge n} = V_{\tau^* \wedge n}$ , and  $V_{\tau^* \wedge n}$  is a martingale.

$$\left(\begin{array}{cc} \circ, \circ & E & W_{t} = EG_{t} \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & \\ & & & \\ & \\ &$$

$$Node(2)$$
  $\circ$   $W  $\geq V \geq G$$ 

Note (2) ° W 
$$\geq \vee \rangle$$
 G (°°° W a mg  $\Rightarrow$  W is a snow mg.   
  $2 \otimes \otimes G \Rightarrow \otimes \otimes \vee \rangle$ .

Since we already know 
$$W \ge V \Rightarrow W_{t^* \wedge t^*} = V_{t^* \wedge t^*}$$
.

Also  $V_{t,n}$  is a my becase  $W_{t,n}$  is a my  $(OST \Rightarrow E_n(W_{t,n}W_{t,n})) = W_{t,n}(n_{t,n}) = W_{t,n}(n_{t,n})$ 

EV.

**Theorem 6.78.** Let  $\sigma^* = \min\{n \mid V_n = \underline{G_n}\}$ . Then  $\sigma^*$  is the minimal solution to the optimal stopping problem for G. Namely,  $EG_{\sigma^*} = \max_{\sigma} EG_{\sigma}$  where the maximum is taken over all finite stopping times  $\sigma$ . Moreover, if  $EG_{\tau^*} = \max_{\sigma} EG_{\sigma}$  for any other finite -stopping time  $\tau^*$ , we must have  $\underline{\tau}^* \geqslant \sigma^*$ . Remark 6.79. By construction  $V_{\sigma^* \wedge n}$  is a martingale. of The ; Know V is a super Ma Dook deemposspon: V = X - ANote = ATAM = 0 = Notam

Pl of claim: 
$$V_n = \max \{G_n, E_n V_{n+1}\}$$
 $F^* = \min \{n \mid V_n = G_n\}$ 
 $\Rightarrow \text{ for } n < F^*, V_n \neq G_n \quad \text{i.e. } V_n = E_n V_{n+1}$ 

More purely  $V_n = V_n = V_n$ 

## Lecture 27 (11/8). Please enable video if you can

hast time: Optimal stopping problem Play game. Can law at my time -> report Gra. Stop at ~ > het reward G how is max EG () Let  $V_N = G_N$  &  $V_n = max \{G_n, E_n v_{n+1}\}$ 

Snell. V is the smallest swar mg 7 Vn > Gn 4m. Le a mg, Wy > Gn Yn. and for some staying time of, EW, =EG  $\int_{M} \int_{M} \int_{M$ ma (Last time). (I.e. Vis a my before time +x).

**Theorem 6.78.** Let  $\sigma^* = \min\{n \mid V_n = G_n\}$ . Then  $\sigma^*$  is the minimal solution to the optimal stopping problem for G. Namely,  $EG_{\sigma^*} = \max_{\sigma} EG_{\sigma}$  where the maximum is taken over all finite stopping times  $\sigma$ . Moreover, if  $EG_{\tau^*} = \max_{\sigma} EG_{\sigma}$  for any other finite stopping time  $\tau^*$ , we must have  $\tau^* \geqslant \sigma^*$ .

Remark 6.79. By construction  $V_{\sigma^* \wedge n}$  is a martingale.

Pf: had time: 
$$V$$
 is a sign mg

Winte  $V = X - A$ 

mg

Predictable, ineversely

 $A_0 = 0$ 

Claim 1 (had time):  $A_{TX} = 0$ 

 $V_n = \max \{ 6_n, E_n V_{n+1} \}$ 

Already know Vn = Xn - An ⇒ Yn < pt must have Ann = An. Sine  $A_0 = 0$   $\Rightarrow$   $A_{n+1} = A_n = A_{n-1} - \cdots = A_0 = 0$ i.e  $\forall M \leqslant \tau^*$ , must have  $A_M = 0 \Rightarrow 0$  gain

 $P_{\delta}: N_{\delta} = X - A \implies X > V > G.$ 

 $= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} E_{t} \leq E_{t} \times \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} X_{t} = E_{t} \times \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} E_$ 

(4) Claim: If  $t^*$  is any salu to the appined stopping draller than  $t^* > t^*$ .

Pf: Chare It to be any solu to the aprilable Stopping from.
i.e. E 67 = max E 67.

NTS 
$$\begin{bmatrix} t^{*} \geq t^{*} \end{bmatrix}$$
.

Claim:  $X_{t^{*}} = V_{t^{*}} = G_{t^{*}}$ .

 $P_{t}$ :  $EG_{t^{*}}$   $EG_{t^{*}}$ 

 $\rightarrow EG_{T*} = EX_{T*}$ 

Knas

Sine 
$$X \ge V \ge G$$
  $\Rightarrow$   $V \ge X_{\pm} = G_{\pm}$   $\Rightarrow$  claim.

This implies  $T^* > T^*$  (°°  $T^* = G_{\pm}$   $\Rightarrow$  claim.

L  $V_{\pm} = G_{\pm}$ 

(DE)

**Theorem 6.80.** For any  $k \in \{0, ..., N\}$ , let  $\sigma_k^* = \min\{n \ge k \mid V_n = G_n\}$ . Then  $\mathbf{E}_k G_{\sigma_k^*} = \max_{\sigma_k} \mathbf{E}_k G_{\sigma_k}$  where the maximum is taken over all finite stopping times  $\sigma_k$  for which  $\sigma_k \ge k$  almost surely.

## Lecture 28 (11/10) Please enable video if you can

Vn = 6, 2 Vn = max 86, En VnH \$ E\* = nim { &n | Vn = 6n}. Showd V colour the aptimal stopping problem

L T+ = constant optimal stopping time

**Theorem 6.81.** Let V = M - A be the Doob decomposition for V, and define  $\tau^* = \max\{n \mid A_n = 0\}$ . Then  $\underline{\tau}^*$  is a stopping time and is the largest solution to the optimal stopping problem for G.  $EG_{TX} > EG_{T}$  for any  $\times \longrightarrow Mq$ A > Pred me, Ao = 0 finte Holping time T. Pf: O Check It is a stopping time. NOTE: In gard wax [n | /n = b? is NOT a stoffing timo

But for . w: A is find & inc & this makes It a stopping time.

Note: 
$$\{t^{+} = n\} = \{A_{n} = 0\} \cap \{A_{n} =$$

Pf: 
$$O$$
  $X_{t} = V_{t} - A_{t}$   $A_{t} = O$   $\Rightarrow$   $X_{t} = V_{t}$ .

(2) NTS  $V_{t} = G_{t}$ .

Say  $t' = u$  (Causely the part  $\{t' = u\}$ )

 $V_{u+1} = X_{u+1} - A_{u+1}$ 
 $V_{u+1} = X_{u+1} - A_{u+1}$ 
 $V_{u+1} = X_{u+1} - A_{u+1}$ 

$$\Rightarrow O_{n} \quad \{z^{*} = n\}, \quad E_{n} \vee_{n+1} < \chi_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\Rightarrow O_{n} \quad \{t^{*} = n\}, \quad E_{n} \vee_{n+1} < V_{n}$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

$$\forall_{n} = V_{n} + A_{n} = V_{n} + 0.$$

Claim 3 is are salm to the opinal storping prohom. Pf: Note for any stoping time T,

Pf: Note for any stopping time 
$$\tau$$
,
$$EG_{t} = EX_{t} \times \frac{OST}{A} \times \frac{OCT}{A} = EX_{t} \times EG_{t}$$

$$QED.$$

V = X - A, V > 6  $\Rightarrow X > V > 6$ 

$$\Rightarrow EG_{\uparrow \star} = \max_{\tau} EG_{\tau} = EG_{\uparrow \star} = EX_{\uparrow \star}.$$

$$\Rightarrow EG_{T*} = E \times_{T*} \xrightarrow{OST} \times_{O} = E \times_{T*}$$

$$\Rightarrow 6^{4*} = \chi^{4*} \qquad (i \times \chi^*) = E \chi^{4*} =$$

Know 
$$X > V > 6$$
  $\Rightarrow$   $X_{T^*} = V_{T^*} = G_{T^*}$   $\Rightarrow$   $A_{T^*} = 0 \Rightarrow T^* \leq T^*$  (def of  $T^*$ )  $Q \in P$ .

## 6.7. American options (with proofs). Consider the N period binomial model with 0 < d < 1 + r < u.

Proposition 6.82. Any American option can be replicated. That is, consider an American option with intrinsic value G. There exists a self financing portfolio X such that:

- (1)  $X_n \geqslant G_n$  for all n
- (2) For some stopping time  $\underline{\underline{\sigma}}^*$ , we have  $X_{\sigma^*} = G_{\sigma^*}$ .

Pho Let 
$$\widehat{P}$$
 be the RNM.

Recall  $X$  is self finance  $\Longrightarrow$   $\widehat{D}_{n}X_{n}$  is a  $\widehat{P}$  my

$$\left(\widehat{D}_{n}=(1+r)^{n}\right).$$

Let  $V_{N}=G_{N}$   $X$   $Y_{n}=\max\left\{G_{n},\frac{1}{D_{n}}\right\}$ 

$$\left(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}(P_{n},V_{n},V_{n})\right\}$$

 $\nabla^* = \min_{n} \{ n \mid V_n = G_n \}.$ Snell: Da Vn ie the condest super mg 7 Vn > Gn An. (A T\* is the snallest som to the affind expression opinal exercise policy). Doef decompose Dava: Write Dava = Daxa -An  $\Gamma$ Prud, inc  $A_0 = \Gamma$ 7- Mg

$$X_n = \text{wealth}$$
 of a self for Port (°;  $D_n X_n$  is a  $P_m g$ ).

Aso,  $D_n X_n = D_n V_n + A_n \ge D_n V_n \ge D_n G_n$ 
 $\Rightarrow X_n \ge G_n \implies \text{cond} \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc$ 

 $\Rightarrow \chi_{N} \geqslant G_{N} \qquad \Rightarrow \text{ cond} \quad ()$   $\text{Finally:} \quad V_{TX} = \chi_{TX} = G_{TX} \quad (\text{Shell})$  QFD.

**Proposition 6.83.** If X is the wealth of a replicating portfolio with  $X_{\sigma^*} = G_{\sigma^*}$ . Then  $\sigma^*$  is an optimal exercise policy. Moreover, if  $\tau^*$  is any optimal exercise policy, then  $X_{\tau^*} = G_{\tau^*}$ 

Corollary 6.84 (Uniqueness). If X, and Y are wealth of two replicating portfolios for an American option with intrinsic value G, then for any optimal exercise time  $\sigma^*$  we must have  $\mathbf{1}_{n \leqslant \sigma^*} X_n = \mathbf{1}_{n \leqslant \sigma^*} Y_n$ .

The Pf: know 
$$P_n \times_n$$
 is a  $P_n \times_n = G_n$   $X_n \ge G_$ 

# Lecture 29 (11/12). Please enabel video if you can

Amica of intuitie Value G Con be reflicated! (i.e. 3 a self fin fort wealth Xn such that  $\begin{cases} 1 & \chi_{n} > 6_{n} \\ 2 & \chi_{r} = 6_{r} \end{cases} \text{ for some stopping time } T^{*}$ 

**Proposition 6.83.** If  $\underline{X}$  is the wealth of a replicating portfolio with  $\underline{X_{\sigma^*} = G_{\sigma^*}}$ . Then  $\underline{\sigma^*}$  is an optimal exercise policy. Moreover, if  $\underline{\tau^*}$  is any optimal exercise policy, then  $X_{\tau^*} = G_{\tau^*}$ 

Corollary 6.84 (Uniqueness). If X, and Y are wealth of two replicating portfolios for an American option with intrinsic value G, then for any optimal exercise time  $\sigma^*$  we must have  $\mathbf{1}_{n \leqslant \sigma^*} X_n = \mathbf{1}_{n \leqslant \sigma^*} Y_n$ .

Keeal!; () An oftion with fogolf Go at time I has AFP  $\widehat{E}(D_0G_+)$  of fine O(2) Let  $V_0 = \widehat{E}(D_T G_T) = AFP$  of the fixed wet officer that pays  $G_T$  at time  $\Gamma$ . 3 Oftim exercise policy: PX + VF = max VF

Claim: 
$$X_{T} = G_{T} \Rightarrow T^{*}$$
 is an adjust exercise pair  $y$ 

Pt: NTS  $V_{0}^{*} > V_{0}^{*} > V_{0}^{*}$ 

For  $V_{0}$ 

Converge Son 
$$t^*$$
 is an arbitral exercise folicy

Thus NTS  $X_{t^*} = G_{t^*}$ .

Pho  $\widetilde{E}(D_t * G_{t^*}) = V_0^{t^*} = \max_{t \in T} V_0^t = V_0^{t^*} = \widetilde{E}(D_t * G_{t^*})$ 
 $= \widetilde{E}(D_t * G_{t^*})$ 
 $= \widetilde{E}(D_t * X_{t^*})$ 
 $\Rightarrow \widetilde{E}(D_t * G_t) = \widetilde{E}(D_t * X_{t^*}) \xrightarrow{OST} \widetilde{E}(D_t * X_{t^*})$ 
 $\Rightarrow D_t G_t = D_{t^*} X_{t^*} \qquad (i) D_t G_{t^*} \leq D_t X_{t^*} \stackrel{?}{=} \text{are equal}.$ 

**Proposition 6.85.** Let  $V_N = G_N$ , and  $V_n = \max\{G_n, D_n^{-1}\tilde{E}_nV_{N+1}\}$ . Then  $V_n$  is the arbitrage free price of the American option. That is, the market remains arbitrage free if we are allowed to trade an American option at price  $V_n$ .

Say we bry one Am off at time in (Price 
$$V_n$$
)

Let  $0 = V_n - V_n$  ( $V_n = V_n$ )

price of anican of  $0 = V_n + V_n$  (insect in about took).

Sell often of time  $T > N$  ( $T > doffing time$ ).

Wealth at time  $T = V_T - V_T$ 

$$\Rightarrow \widetilde{E}_{M} \left( D_{T} V_{T} - D_{T} Y_{T} \right) = \widetilde{E}_{M} \left( D_{E} V_{T} \right) - D_{M} Y_{M}$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

$$\left( N \operatorname{Me} V_{M} = \max \left\{ \widehat{G}_{M} \right\} \frac{1}{D_{M}} E_{M} \left( D_{M} Y_{M} Y_{M} \right) \right\}$$

$$\Rightarrow P_{M} V_{M} \geq \widetilde{E}_{M} \left( D_{M} Y_{M} Y_{M} \right)$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

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$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

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$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

$$\left( \stackrel{\circ}{\circ} Y - \operatorname{cell} \right) \left\{ \widehat{\mu}_{M} \Rightarrow D_{M} Y_{M} \times \widehat{A} + \operatorname{Fung} \right\}$$

we sell on Am off at fine n. pria of an of max { r, u} exercises Amiran often optimaly (at time

$$\frac{1}{2} = \sum_{n} \left( \frac{D_{n} V_{n}}{D_{n} V_{n}} \right) = \frac{D_{n} V_{n}}{D_{n} V_{n}} = \frac{D_{n} V_{$$


Lecture 30 (11/15) Please enable video if you can

### 7. Fundamental theorems of Asset Pricing

#### 7.1. Markets with multiple risky assets.

- (1)  $\underline{\Omega} = \{1, \dots, \underline{M}\}^{N}$  is a probability space representing N rolls of M-sided dies, and p is a probability mass function on  $\Omega$ .
- The die rolls need not be i.i.d.
- (2) The die rolls need not be 1.1.d. (3) Consider a financial market with d+1 assets  $S_{i}^{0}$ ,  $S_{i}^{1}$ , ...,  $S_{i}^{d}$ . ( $S_{n}^{k}$  denotes the price of the k-th asset at time n.) (4) For  $i \in \{1, ..., d\}$ ,  $S_{i}^{i}$  is an adapted process (i.e.  $S_{n}^{i}$  is  $\mathcal{F}_{n}$ -measurable).
- (5) The 0-th asset  $S^0$  is assumed to be a risk free bank/money market:
- (a) Let  $r_n$  be an adapted process specifying the interest rate at time n. (b) Let  $S_0^0 = \mathbb{Q}$ , and  $S_{n+1}^0 = (1+r_n)S_n^0$ . (Note  $S^0$  is predictable.)
  (c) Let  $D_n = (S_n^0)^{-1}$  be the discount factor  $(D_n \text{ dollars}$  time 0 becomes 1 dollar at time n).

  (6) Let  $\Delta_n = (\Delta_n^0, \ldots, \Delta_n^d)$  be the position at time n of an investor in each of the assets  $(S_n^0, \ldots, S_n^d)$ .
- The wealth of an investor holding these assets is given by  $X_n = \Delta_n \cdot S_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=0}^d \sum_{j=0}^d \sum_{i=0}^j S_n^i$ .



**Definition 7.1.** Consider a portfolio whose positions in the assets at time n is  $\Delta_n$ . We say this portfolio is self-financing if  $\Delta_n$  is adapted, and  $\Delta_n \cdot S_{n+1} = \Delta_{n+1} \cdot S_{n+1}$ .

Ahr time n -> postion on Wealth And Sn Time n+1 -> Stock priors charge from Sy -> Sur

Change forthins on the assets Rule > No external cash flow (\$ in the montest stays in the montat). New positions at time up are  $\Delta_{n+1}^0$ ,  $\Delta_{n+1}^1$ ,  $\Delta_{n+1}^1$ 

No extend cosh flow -> Wealth should be the same -> Sun - Ann Sun

### 7.2. First fundamental theorem of asset pricing.

**Definition 7.2.** We say the market is arbitrage free if for any self financing portfolio with wealth process X, we have:  $X_0 = 0$  and  $X_N \ge 0$  implies  $X_N = 0$  almost surely.

**Definition 7.3.** We say  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}$  is a risk neutral measure if  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{P}}$  is equivalent to  $\boldsymbol{P}$  and  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{E}}_n(D_{n+1}S_{n+1}^i) = D_nS_n^i$  for every  $i \in \{0, \dots, d\}$ .

**Theorem 7.4.** The market defined in Section 7.1 is arbitrage free if and only if there exists a risk neutral measure.

Diff from Biron: Du is nordon

(Du 19 a predictable frocess).

**Lemma 7.5.** If  $\tilde{P}$  is a risk neutral measure, then the discounted wealth of any self-financing portfolio is a  $\tilde{P}$ -martingale. Proof that existence of a risk neutral measure implies no-arbitrage. 7.5: Son P is a RNM  $\Rightarrow \forall i \in \{0, -d\}, \qquad \widehat{E}_{N}\left(D_{NH}S_{NH}\right) = D_{N}S_{N}^{l}$ 

In = wealth of any

$$Nole: \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{n} \left( D_{n+1} \times_{n+1} \right) = \stackrel{\sim}{E}_{n} \left( D_{n+1} \times_{n+1} \times_{n+1} \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

$$= \widetilde{E}_{M} \left( D_{n+1} \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n+1} \right)$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{d} \Delta_{i} \sum_{m} \left( \sum_{i=0}^{n} \Delta_{i} \sum_{m} \sum_{m} \Delta_{m} \right) \left( \sum_{i=0}^{n} \Delta_{i} \sum_{m} \sum_{m} \Delta_{m} \right)$$

( or ) is self fin).

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{d} \Delta_{n}^{i} D_{n} S_{n}^{i}$$

$$= D_{n} \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n} = D_{n} X_{n}$$

$$QED.$$

Pf:  $\widehat{P} \longrightarrow RNM$ .

Start with X = 0 Q X = wealth of a set fin fort.

Pf that 3 a RNM => No and !

Shapose 
$$X_N > 0$$
 NTS  $X_N = 0$ 

Pf: Note 
$$E(D_{XX}) = D_{X0} = D$$

$$E(D_{NN}) = D_{N} = 0$$

$$(\text{of } D_{N} X_{N} \text{ is a } P \text{ mg})$$

$$P \text{ a.s.}$$

$$P \text{ D.} X_{N} = 0$$

$$P \text{ Resc}$$

$$\Rightarrow D_{NN} = 0 \qquad (\widehat{P} \text{ a.s.}) \qquad \Rightarrow D_{NN} = 0 \qquad P \text{ (a.s.)}$$

Lecture 31 (11/17). Please enable your video if you can.

(Note for i=0,  $D_n S_n^0 = D_{n+1} S_{n+1}^0 = 1$ => En (Dat Son) = Dush Last time: FTAP1: @ If a RNM existe then there is no arb.

Notation: Sufferent - time (n)
super sent 2 - the o stack.

(proved last time) (b) No art => 3 a RNM ( med not be vigue ) (IOU Proof > today).

Corollary 7.6. Suppose the market has a risk neutral measure  $\tilde{P}$ . Let  $V_N$  be a  $\mathcal{F}_N$ -measurable random variable and consider an security that pays  $V_N$  at time N. Then  $V_n = D_n^{-1} \tilde{E}_n(D_N V_N)$  is a arbitrage free price at time  $n \leq N$ . (i.e. allowing you to trade this security in the market with price  $V_n$  at time n keeps the market arbitrage free).

Remark 7.7. We do not, however, know that the security can be replicated.

By FTAP (fort 1): Existence of a RNM 
$$\Rightarrow$$
 No art.

Will find a RNM for the extended month.

Claim P is a RNM on the extended model!

Phi O Almody know  $D_n S_n^i$  is a  $\widehat{P}$  my  $\widehat{P}$  is  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  my  $\widehat{P}$  is a  $\widehat{P}$  my  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat{P}$  my  $\widehat{P}$  and  $\widehat$ 

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \widehat{D}_{N} V_{N} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \widehat{D}_{n} V_{N} \right) = \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \widehat{D}_{N} V_{N} \right)$$

$$= \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \widehat{D}_{N} V_{N} \right) = \widehat{D}_{n} V_{n} \quad \text{of } D,$$

hoal: Pf of convene > No out > ] a RNM.

**Lemma 7.8.** Suppose the market has no arbitrage, and  $\underline{X}$  is the wealth process of a self-financing portfolio. If for any n,  $\underline{X_n = 0}$  and  $X_{n+1} \ge 0$ , then we must have  $X_{n+1} = 0$  almost surely.

**Lemma 7.9.** Suppose we find an equivalent measure 
$$\tilde{P}$$
 such that whenever  $\Delta_n \cdot S_n = 0$ , we have  $\tilde{E}_n(\underline{\Delta}_n \cdot S_{n+1}) = 0$ , then  $\tilde{P}$  is a risk neutral measure.

$$A_n = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \\ -1 & 1 & 1 \\ -1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$A_n = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 \\ -1 & 1 &$$

u At time u, buy I share of S' & borrow from bank

Lets chuck Pm Sm is a P

i.e. 
$$\Delta_{N} = \frac{1}{S_{N}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{S_{N}^{0}}\right)$$

$$\Delta_{N} = -\frac{1}{S_{N}^{0}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{S_{N}^{0}}\right)$$

$$\Delta_{N} = 0 \quad \forall i \quad \forall i \quad \forall j \quad \forall i \quad \forall j \quad \forall$$

By accomption: 
$$\widehat{E}_{n} \left( \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n+1} \right) = 0$$

$$\left( \underbrace{antile}_{S_{n}} \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n+1} \right) = -\frac{S_{n}}{S_{n}^{0}} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} + 1 \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} + 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n+1} \right) = -\frac{S_{n}}{S_{n}^{0}} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} + 1 \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} + 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \left( \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n+1} \right) = -\frac{S_{n}}{S_{n}^{0}} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} + 1 \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{0} = 0$$

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$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{n} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = S_{n}^{1} \cdot S_{n+1}^{1} = 0$$

**Lemma 7.10.** Suppose  $\tilde{p}$  is a probability mass function such that  $\tilde{p}(\omega) = \tilde{p}_1(\omega_1)\tilde{p}_2(\omega_1,\omega_2)\cdots\tilde{p}_N(\omega_1,\ldots,\omega_N)$ . If  $X_{n+1}$  is  $\mathcal{F}_{n+1}$ -measurable,


then 
$$\frac{M}{2}$$

then 
$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{E}}_{n}X_{n+1}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \tilde{p}_{n+1}(\omega', j)X_{n+1}(\omega', j), \quad \text{where} \quad \omega' = (\omega_{1}, \dots, \omega_{n}), \omega = (\omega', \omega_{n+1}, \omega_{n+1}, \dots, \omega_{N})$$

 $\textbf{Lemma 7.11.} \ \ \textit{Define} \ \underline{\bar{Q}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{v \in \mathbb{R}^M \ | \ \underline{v_i} \geqslant 0 \ \forall i \in \{1, \dots, \underline{M}\}\}, \ \textit{and} \ \ \mathring{Q} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{v \in \mathbb{R}^M \ | \ v_i > 0 \ \forall i \in \{1, \dots, M\}\}. \ \ \textit{Let} \ \underline{V \subseteq R^M} \ \ \textit{be a subspace}.$ 


- (1)  $V \cap \bar{Q} = \{0\}$  if and only if there exists  $\hat{n} \in \mathring{Q}$  such that  $|\hat{n}| = 1$  and  $\hat{n} \perp V$ .
- (2) The unit normal vector  $\hat{n} \in \mathring{Q}$  is unique if and only if  $V \cap \bar{Q} = \{0\} \setminus M$  dim(V) = M 1.

Remark 7.12. This can be proved using the Hyperplane separation theorem used in convex analysis.



# Lecture 32 (11/19). Please enable your video if you can

FTAP 1: No art (=> 3 a RNM. Simpler -> FRNM -> No ont (done a few lectures ago) Horder > No arts > 3 RNM. Wealth at time n. Lest time: ( ) Soy 7 is a measure + Whenever and Sn = 0 we have  $E_n(4, S_{n+1}) = 0$ Then P is a RNM.



Proof of Theorem 7.4 (No arbitrage implies existence of a risk neutral measure). Assume : No art. NTS: 3 a RNM. Cae I:  $N = 1 \stackrel{\circ}{\cdot} \quad \text{Start with} \quad \chi = 0 = 0 \stackrel{\circ}{\cdot} \stackrel{\circ}{\cdot} \qquad \left( 0 = (0) - 0 \stackrel{\circ}{\cdot} \stackrel{\circ}{\cdot} \right) \in \mathbb{R}^{d+1}$ Let  $V = \{ \Delta_0 \cdot S_1 \mid \Delta_0 \cdot S_0 = 0 \} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^M$ i.e.  $V = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(1) \\ \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(2) \\ \end{array} \right\}$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(2) \\ \end{array} \right\}$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(2) \\ \end{array} \right\}$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} A_0 \cdot S_1(2) \\ \end{array} \right\}$   $\left\{ \begin{array}{c} A_$ 

(i.e. 
$$\triangle_0$$
.  $S_1$  as a vector with it wording when wealth if the first die rolls  $^\circ$ .)

Note:  $\mathbb{O} \vee \mathbb{C} \times \mathbb{R}^M$  is a subspace (You check), quich).

(2)  $\vee \mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q} = \mathcal{Q} \circ \mathcal{J}$  (... No onto  $\vee \mathbb{Q} = \mathcal{J}$ )

House: homa  $7.11 \Rightarrow \exists \hat{n} \in \mathbb{Q} + \hat{n}(i) > 0$ 

( $\hat{n}(i) = i \text{th} wordingte of  $\hat{n}$ ).$ 

Let 
$$\mathcal{F}(i) = \frac{\hat{n}(i)}{2 \hat{n}(j)}$$
 Claim  $\hat{f}(i) = RNP$  at die rall =  $\hat{i}$  (rund denom & to ensure  $\frac{M}{2} \mathcal{F}(i) = 1$ )

Compute  $E(\Delta_0 \cdot S_1)$  for any  $\Delta_0 \cdot S_0 = 0$ 

Note  $\widetilde{E}(\Delta_0 S) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \widetilde{F}(i) + \Delta_0 S_i(i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\widetilde{h}(i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \widetilde{h}(i)} \Delta_0 S_i(i)$ 

$$\frac{1}{2}\hat{a}(j) = \frac{1}{2}\hat{a}(j) = \frac{1}$$

Che 2: 
$$N = 2$$
.

Suppose  $\omega_1 = 1$  (1st die alneely walleel 1).

Stat wh  $\Delta_1 \in \mathbb{R}^d$  +  $\Delta_1 \cdot S_1(1) = 0$ 

(i.e. bealth at time 1 if it die is 1 = 0)

Let  $V = \{ \Delta_1 \cdot S_2(1, \cdot) \mid \Delta_1 \cdot S_1(1) = 0 \}$ 

 $\int_{2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right) = \frac{\hat{n}(i)}{2\hat{n}(i)}$ 

Sog 
$$\wp_1 = 1$$
 &  $\wp_1 = 0$ 

lemps let  $E_1(\wp_1, \wp_2)(1) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \wp_2(j, \wp_1) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \wp_2(j, \wp_2(j, \wp_2)) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \wp_2(j, \wp_2(j$ 

Lecture 33 (11/22). Please enable video if you can.

So for ? Binois model OZ d Z I + r Z n - Complete & and free

Every scenty can be reducated.


FTAP1: And free (=) 3 a RNM.

### 7.3. Second fundamental theorem.

**Definition 7.13.** A market is said to be *complete* if every derivative security can be hedged.

**Theorem 7.14.** The market defined in Section 7.1 is complete and arbitrage free if and only if there exists a unique risk neutral measure. I bank d stocks (S, S-- 4Sd)

I bank a stocks (S, S-- 4Sd) (>> +n < N, X = migne AFP of the security)



**Lemma 7.15.** The market is complete if and only if for every  $\mathcal{F}_{n+1}$ -measurable random variable  $X_{n+1}$ , there exists a (not necessarily unique)  $\mathcal{F}_n$  measurable random vector  $\underline{\Delta}_n = (\Delta_n^0, \dots, \Delta_n^d)$  such that  $\underline{X_{n+1}} = \underline{\Delta}_n \cdot \underline{S_{n+1}}$ .

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$
where  $A_n = \begin{pmatrix} \Delta_n & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$  and  $A_n = \begin{pmatrix} \Delta_n & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ 

Sag market is complète. XN is some &-neas RV. Let  $V_N = X_N = \text{payoff of a security at time } N$ Complèle = con he replicated.

a = 3 a self for part  $(X_N, \Delta_N) + X_N = V_N$ .

Know (1) Wealth at time 
$$M = X_n = A_n \cdot S_n = \sum_{i=0}^{d} a_i S_n$$

$$2 (2) \Delta_n \cdot S_{n+1} = \Delta_n \cdot S_{n+1}$$

$$X_{n+1} = A_n \cdot S_{n+1}$$

$$X_{n+1} = A_n \cdot S_{n+1}$$

Lanversely: Sag 
$$\forall f_{n+1}$$
 means  $R \vee V_{n+1}$ ,  $\exists \Delta_n \quad (f_{n}-\text{meas})$ 

NTS: Market is complete.

Let  $V_N = \text{fagaff}$  of some security

NTF  $(X_n, \Delta_n)$  self for  $\forall X_n = V_N$ .

Pf: By assuffin  $3 \Delta_{N-1} + V_N = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot S_N$ 

Let 
$$X_{N} = V_{N}$$
. Let  $X_{N-1} = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot S_{N-1}$ 

$$Assurption \Rightarrow \exists \Delta_{N-2} (f_{N-2} - meas) + X_{N-1} = \Delta_{N-2} \cdot S_{N-1}$$

$$Set X_{N-2} = \Delta_{N-2} \cdot S_{N-2} \quad \text{Rewigne}.$$

$$Self fin: \Delta_{N-2} \cdot S_{N-1} \quad \text{Mant} \quad \Delta_{N-1} \cdot S_{N-1}$$

$$N-2 \quad N-1 \qquad N-1 \qquad N-1$$

$$N=2 \quad N-1 \qquad N-1$$

$$\frac{1}{N-2} \cdot \frac{1}{N-1} = \frac{1}{N-1} \cdot \frac{1}$$

RNM migne @ complete 2 art fre. Proof of Theorem 7.14 lase 1: N = 1.  $= \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(1) \\ \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(2) \end{array} \right\} \in \mathbb{R}^M \quad \Delta_0 \cdot S_0 = 0 \right\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^M \quad \text{(cubalue)}.$ Let  $U = \left\{ \Delta_0 \cdot S_1(1) \right\} = \left\{ \Delta_0$  Recall: | I | I | I | I | V · Hun can we is to make a RNM. (Chare P<sub>1</sub>(i) hat time  $\frac{\hat{n}_{e}}{\sum_{j=1}^{M} \hat{n}_{j}}$  got a RNM L convenely  $\mathcal{F}(i)$  is the RN probability that it die role if then  $(\mathcal{F}(i))$   $\in \mathbb{Q}$  & is  $\bot$   $\lor$ 

Say Maket is complete & and free.

$$\Rightarrow V \cap \emptyset = \{0\}$$
 (follows since no ant)

L  $U = \mathbb{R}^M$  (follows since the mobil is complete

L have  $7.11$ )

In this case

 $\dim(V) = \dim(U) - 1$  (on  $HW$ )

 $\Rightarrow \dim(V) = M - 1$  (2  $V \cap \emptyset' = \{0\}$ )  $\Rightarrow M \in \emptyset$  is wigne

reseale contrate  $C \Rightarrow \{0\}$  is wigne

(i.e. RNM is migre).

Converely; Sulface The RNM is migre.

Know if 
$$\hat{n} \in \hat{Q}$$
 &  $\hat{n} \perp V$ 

then can receale woodmiles of  $\hat{n}$  & got a RNM.

RNM migre  $\implies \hat{n}$  is migre  $\implies \text{dim}(V) = M-1$ 
 $\implies \text{dim}(U) = M$   $\implies \text{completeness}$ .

# Lecture 34 (11/29). Please enable video if you can.

Roeall : FTAPI: No arb = Existence of a RNM. FTAP 2 ° No ant 2 compleneteruss & Existene & mig of a RWM

#### 7.4. Examples and Consequences.

**Proposition 7.16.** Suppose the market model Section 7.1 is complete and arbitrage free, and let  $\tilde{P}$  be the unique risk neutral measure. If  $D_nX_n$  is a  $\tilde{P}$  martingale, then  $X_n$  must be the wealth of a self financing portfolio.

Remark 7.17. We've already seen in Lemma 7.5 that if a (not necessarily unique) risk neutral measure exists, then the discounted wealth of any self financing portfolio must be a martingale under it.

Remark 7.18. All pricing results/formulae we derived for the Binomial model that only relied on the analog of Proposition 7.16 will hold in complete arbitrage free markets.

APT of Prat 7.16. Know DX is a P mg NTS: Xn = wealth of a self for fort i.e. NTF a trading strat  $\Delta_n + \chi_n = \underline{\Delta}_n \cdot S_n$ 

$$\Delta_{n} = (\Delta_{n}, \Delta_{n} - \Delta_{n}), \quad \Delta_{n} \cdot S_{n} = \frac{1}{2} \Delta_{n}^{i} \cdot S_{n}^{i} = \frac{1}{2} \Delta_$$

Mahet is camplede: 
$$\Rightarrow \exists \Delta_{N-1} \quad (\xi_{N-1} - wens) + \underline{\chi}_{N} = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot \underline{S}_{N}$$

$$Claim \quad \chi = \Delta \cdot \underline{S}$$

$$\frac{C}{Aim} \times N = A_{N-1} \cdot S_{N-1}$$

$$\frac{1}{N-1} = \frac{1}{N-1} \cdot \frac{1}{N-1}$$

$$\frac{1}{N-1} \cdot \frac{1}{N-1} \cdot \frac{1}$$


$$\Rightarrow \widehat{E}_{N-1}(\widehat{P}_{N}X_{N}) = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot (\widehat{E}_{N-1}(\widehat{P}_{N}S_{N}))$$

$$\Rightarrow D_{N+1}X_{N-1} = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot (\widehat{P}_{N}S_{N-1})$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{N+1} = \Delta_{N-1} \cdot S_{N-1}$$

Rekent: Def of completenes =)  $\exists \Delta_{N-2} + \chi_{N-1} = \Delta_{N-2} \cdot S_{N-1} - (\chi_{N})$ 

By alone, get  $X_{N-2} = A_{N-2} \circ S_{N-2}$ Keep going & get the trading strat ( In ) Note: This trading strat is self fin log egrating (x) & (& mekeating) Question 7.19. Consider a market consisting of a <u>bank</u> with interest rate r, and two stocks with price processes  $S^1$ ,  $S^2$ . At each time step we flip two independent coins. The price of the i-th stock ( $i \in \{1,2\}$ ) changes by factor  $u_i$ , or  $d_i$  depending on whether the i-th coin is heads or tails. When is this market arbitrage free? When is this market complete?



6

In matrix form:  $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ a_1 & a_1 & a_2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{F} \\ \tilde{A} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 + \tilde{A} \end{pmatrix}$ 

Have a RNM (=> we have >0 solutions to (a). himen Alg: 3 eg l 2 menours -> mon not have a soln. Will only have solutions of the system is consistent e.g. if the 3rd cy is a contract of the first 2 Financially: New S2 to be a combinion of Back & S1

Rule of thint: To got a complete & out fine mortant with d stocks, M.M., will need to roll a dt 1 sided die (While down egy for RNM.
get (# astocker + 1) egns in (# faces of the die)
unknowns

Question 7.20. Consider now repeated rolls of a 3-sided die and for  $i \in \{1,2\}$ , suppose  $S_{n+1}^i = \underbrace{f_{i,j}}S_n^i$ , if  $\omega_{n+1} = j$ . How do you find the risk neutral measure? Find conditions when this market is complete and arbitrage free.

$$(j \in \{1, 2, 3\}).$$

K finding 
$$\Delta$$
:

 $V_0 = \frac{1}{14\pi} E_1 V_1 \longrightarrow \text{find } V_1$ 

Character 
$$\Delta_0$$
 so that  $\Delta_0$   $S_1 = V$ 

$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) = V_1(1)$$

$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) = V_1(1)$$

$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) = V_1(1)$$

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$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) = V_1(1)$$

$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) = V_1(1)$$

$$\Delta_0^2 S_1(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1) + \Delta_0^2 S_1^2(1)$$

#### 8. Black-Scholes Formula

- (1) Suppose now we can trade *continuously in time*.
- (2) Consider a market with a bank and a stock, whose spot price at time t is denoted by  $S_t$ .
- (3) The continuously compounded interest rate is r (i.e. money in the bank grows like  $\partial_t C(t) = rC(t)$ .
- (4) Assume liquidity, neglect transaction costs (frictionless), and the borrowing/lending rates are the same.
- (5) In the Black-Scholes setting, we model the stock prices by a Geometric Brownian motion with parameters  $\alpha$  (the mean return rate) and  $\sigma$  (the volatility).
- (6) The price at time t of a European call with maturity T and strike K is given by

$$c(t,x) = xN(d_{+}(T-t,x)) - Ke^{-r(T-t)}N(d_{-}(T-t,x)),$$
where  $d_{\pm} = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{\tau}} \left( \ln\left(\frac{x}{K}\right) + \left(r \pm \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}\right)\tau\right), \qquad N(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} e^{-y^{2}/2} dy.$ 

(7) Can be obtained as the limit of the Binomial model as  $N \to \infty$  by choosing:

$$r_{\mathrm{binom}} = \frac{r}{N}$$
,  $u = u_N = 1 + \frac{r}{N} + \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}}$   $d = d_N = 1 + \frac{r}{N} - \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}}$ 

## 9. Recurrence of Random Walks

- Let  $\xi_n$  be a sequence of i.i.d. coin flips with  $P(\xi_n = 1) = P(\xi_n = -1) = 1/2$ .
- Simple random walk:  $S_n = \sum_{1}^{n} \xi_k$  (i.e.  $S_0 = 0$ ,  $S_{n+1} = S_n + \xi_{n+1}$ ).

**Definition 9.1.** The process  $S_n$  is recurrent at 0 if  $P(S_n = 0 \text{ infinitely often }).$ 

Question 9.2. Is the random walk (in one dimension) recurrent at 0? How about at any other value?

Question 9.3. Say  $\xi_n$  are i.i.d. random vectors in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  with  $\mathbf{P}(\xi_n = \pm e_i) = \frac{1}{2d}$ . Set  $S_n = \sum_{i=1}^n \xi_k$ . Is  $S_n$  recurrent at 0?

**Theorem 9.4.** The simple random walk in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  is recurrent for d = 1, 2 and transient for  $d \ge 3$ .

- Let  $\tau_0 = \min\{n \mid S_n = 0\}$ , be the first time S returns to 0. • Let  $\tau_1 = \min\{n \ge \tau_0 \mid S_n = 0\}$ , be the first time after  $\tau_0$  that S returns to 0.
- Let  $\tau_{k+1} = \min\{n \ge \tau_k \mid S_n = 0\}$ , be the first time after  $\tau_k$  that S returns to 0.

**Lemma 9.5.** S is recurrent at 0 if and only if  $P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$ .

**Lemma 9.6.**  $P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$  if and only if  $\sum P(S_n = 0) = \infty$ .

Proof.

**Theorem 9.7.**  $P(S_{2m} = 0) = O(1/m^{d/2})$ . Consequently, the random walk is recurrent for  $d \leq 2$ , and transient for  $d \geq 3$ .

**Lemma 9.8** (Sterling's formula). For large n, we have

$$n! \approx \sqrt{2\pi} \exp\left(n \ln n - n + \frac{1}{2}\right).$$

Proof of Theorem 9.7 for d = 1:

Lecture 35 (12/1). Please enable video if you can.

Random work in continuous time 
$$P(\zeta_n = 1) = P(\zeta_n = -1) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

$$X_n = \sum_{k=1}^{3} k$$

$$X_n = \sum_{k=1}^{3}$$

## 8. Black-Scholes Formula


- Suppose now we can trade continuously in time.
- Consider a market with a bank and a stock, whose spot price at time t is denoted by  $S_t$ .
- The continuously compounded interest rate is r (i.e. money in the bank grows like  $\partial_t C(t) = rC(t)$ .
- Assume liquidity, neglect transaction costs (frictionless), and the borrowing/lending rates are the same.
- In the Black-Scholes setting, we model the stock prices by a Geometric Brownian motion with parameters  $\alpha$  (the mean return rate) and  $\sigma$  the volatility).

The price at time 
$$t$$
 of a European call with maturity  $T$  and strike  $K$  is given by 
$$c(\underline{t},\underline{x}) = \underline{x}\underline{N}(d_{+}(T-t,x)) - \underline{K}e^{-r(T-t)}N(d_{-}(T-t,x)),$$
 where  $d_{\pm} = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{\tau}}\left(\frac{\ln\left(\frac{x}{K}\right) + \left(r \pm \frac{\sigma^{2}}{2}\right)\tau\right), \quad N(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\int_{-\infty}^{x}e^{-y^{2}/2}\,dy.$ 
To Can be obtained as the limit of the Binomial model as  $N \to \infty$  by choosing:

(7) Can be obtained as the limit of the Binomial model as  $N \to \infty$  by choosing:  $r_{\mathrm{binom}} = \frac{r}{N}$ ,  $\underline{u} = u_N = 1 + \frac{r}{N} + \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}}\right)$   $\underline{d} = d_N = 1 + \frac{r}{N} + \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}}\right)$ 


$$u - d = \frac{2\pi}{\sqrt{N}}$$

## 9. Recurrence of Random Walks




Question 9.2. Is the random walk (in one dimension) recurrent at 0? How about at any other value?

Question 9.3. Say  $\xi_n$  are i.i.d. random vectors in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  with  $\mathbf{P}(\xi_n = \pm e_i) = \frac{1}{2d}$ . Set  $S_n = \sum_{i=1}^n \xi_k$ . Is  $S_n$  recurrent at 0?



**Theorem 9.4.** The simple random walk in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  is recurrent for  $\underline{d} = 1, \underline{2}$  and transient for  $\underline{d} \geqslant 3$ .



Lemma 9.5. S is recurrent at 0 if and only if 
$$P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$$
.

P(
$$S_n$$
 vehus to 0 in fintly often) =  $S_n$  vehus to 0 in fintly often) =  $S_n$  vehus to 0 onee =  $S_n$  vehus to 0 one =  $S_n$  vehu

>> P(T(6) = 1

Lemma 9.6. 
$$P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$$
 if and only if  $\sum P(S_n = 0) = \infty$ .

Proof.

$$P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$$
 if and only if  $\sum P(S_n = 0) = \infty$ .

$$P(\tau_0 < \infty) = 1$$

$$V = 0$$

(i-e. Sy is vecent at 0)

Lecture 36 (12/3). Please enable video if you can .

Thu (hast time): 
$$3_n \rightarrow iid$$
.  $P(3_n=1) = P(3_n=-1) = \frac{1}{2}$ .  $S_0 = 0$ 

C is need at of 0 if  $P(5_n=0) = 1$ .

Thu (Last time): In dim  $d = 1$  or 2, the RW is not we.

In dim  $d \geq 3$  the RW is NOT we.

- Let  $\tau_1 = \min\{n > 0 \mid S_n = 0\}$ , be the first time S returns to 0.

**Lemma 9.5.** S is recurrent at 0 if and only if  $P(\tau_{\mathbf{p}} < \infty) = 1$ .

Pf lat fine.

Lemma 9.6. 
$$P(\tau_{p} < \infty) = 1$$
 if and only if  $\sum_{N=0}^{\infty} P(S_{n} = 0) = \infty$ .

Proof.

$$P(S_{n} = 0) = \infty$$

$$P(S_{n} = 0) = \sum_{N=0}^{\infty} P(S_{n} = 0) = \sum_{N=0}$$

Proof.

(2) 
$$E(\# \text{fines in} + S_m = 0) = \prod_{1-P(\tau_1 < \infty)} \frac{1}{1-P(\tau_1 < \infty)}$$

$$P_1: F(\# \text{fines in} + S_m = 0) = E\left(\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{q\tau_n < \omega_1^2}\right)$$

$$= \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} P(\tau_n < \infty) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} P(\tau_n < \infty)$$

$$= \frac{p(\tau_1 < \lambda)}{1 - p(\tau_1 < \lambda)} = \frac{p(\tau_1 < \lambda)}{1 - p(\tau_1 < \lambda)}$$

$$= \frac{p(\tau_1 < \lambda)}{1 - p(\tau_1 < \lambda)} \qquad (P(\tau_2 < \lambda) = P(\tau_1 < \lambda))$$

Equale 
$$0$$
  $80$ :  $E(\# hmg m + S_m = 0) = ZP(S_n = 0) = P(T_1 < \infty)$ 

$$= ZP(S_n = 0) = \infty \iff P(T_1 * C * N) = 1$$

$$QED.$$

**Theorem 9.7.** 
$$|P(S_{2m} = 0)| = O(1/m^{d/2})$$
. Consequently, the random walk is recurrent for  $d \le 2$ , and transient for  $d \ge 3$ .

$$S_{m} = RW$$
 in  $d$  dim.

$$Assumg P(S_{2m} = 0) = O(\frac{1}{m}d_{2}).$$

Note Compaison test: 
$$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}$$

e. S is we of 
$$0 \Leftrightarrow d \leqslant 1 \Leftrightarrow d \leqslant 2 \Leftrightarrow D$$
.

or sis we of 
$$V = V \leq 1$$
 (5)  $d \leq 2$  QED.

larghe 
$$P(S_{2n} = 0)$$
.

 $d = 1$ :  $P(S_{2n} = 0) = {2n \choose n} \cdot {-1 \choose 2} {-1 \choose 2}$ 
 $= \frac{1}{2n} {2n \choose n} = \frac{1}{2n} \frac{(2n)!}{(n!)^2} \cdot {-1 \choose 2}$ 

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} 1\\2\\2\end{array}\right)$$

Lemma 9.8 (Sterling's formula). For large 
$$n$$
, we have
$$\underline{\underline{n!}} \approx \sqrt{2\pi n} \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^{\underline{n}} = \sqrt{2\pi} \exp\left(n \ln n - n + \frac{\ln n}{2}\right).$$

have 
$$\frac{\overline{\pi n}}{\overline{e}} \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^{\underline{n}}$$

e have
$$\sqrt{2\pi n} \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^n =$$

we have 
$$\sqrt{2\pi n} \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^{\frac{n}{2}}$$

 $\sum_{k=1}^{\infty} l_k x = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} l_k x = \sum_{k$ 

 $P(S_{2n}=0) \approx \frac{1}{2^{2n}}, \quad \sqrt{2\pi 2n} \quad (2n)$   $\sqrt{2\pi 2n} \quad (n)$   $\sqrt{2\pi 2n} \quad (n)$   $\sqrt{2\pi 2n} \quad (n)$   $\sqrt{2\pi 2n} \quad (n)$ 

Proof of Theorem 9.7 for d=1:

$$\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{2} \sqrt{n} \frac{2n}{2n}$$

$$\frac{2n}{2n} \sqrt{2n}$$

Remark 9.9. Recall the Gambler's ruin example (Question 6.50): Let  $\xi_n$  be i.i.d. random variables with mean 0, and let  $X_n = \sum_{1}^n \xi_k$ . Let  $\tau$  min $\{n \mid X_n = 1\}$ . Theorem 9.7 proves  $\tau < \infty$  almost surely. We proved earlier  $EX_{\tau} = 1$  and  $\lim_{N \to \infty} EX_{\tau \wedge N} = 0$ .

**Theorem 9.10.** Consider the Gamblers ruin example, with  $\tau = \min\{n \mid X_n = 1\}$ . Then


$$\boxed{\underline{E\tau = \infty}} \quad and \quad \boxed{P(\tau = 2n - 1) = (-1)^{n-1} \binom{1/2}{n} \approx \frac{C}{n^{3/2}}}$$

Remark 9.11. Let  $\underline{M}_n = \min\{X_{\tau \wedge k} \mid k \leq \underline{n}\}$ . Then  $\underline{E}\underline{M}_{\tau} = -\infty$ . Thus, this strategy will take (on average) an infinite time before you win \$1. During that time your expected maximum loss is  $-\infty$ .

**Lemma 9.12.** Let  $F(x) = Ex^{T}$ . Then  $F(x) = \frac{1}{x}(1 - \sqrt{1 - x^{2}})$ .

P(x) = E 
$$n^{T}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}n^{T} + \frac{1}{2}En^{T} + \frac{1}{2}^{T} + \frac{1}{2}^{T} + \frac{1}{2}^{T}$$



$$T'' = \begin{cases} \inf f & \text{three after } T' \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist of } T \\ \text{dist of } T' = \text{dist o$$

Proof of Theorem 9.10

(1) 
$$E t = \emptyset$$
.  
Pf:  $F(x) = E x^{T} = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - x^{2}}}{x}$ 

off both 1: 
$$F'(1) = ET$$

Put  $x=1$ :  $F'(1) = ET$ 

Find  $F'(1)$  from finde  $ext{let} = +\infty$ .

of what 
$$x = F'(x) = Exp$$

Put  $x = 1$ :  $F'(1) = Ex$ 

Find  $F'(1)$  because  $f(x) = f(x)$ 

$$F_{xt} = F(x) = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - x^2}}{x}$$

$$F_{xt} = \frac{1}{2} P(t=0) + x P(t=1) + x^2 P(t=2) + \cdots$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} x P(t=1) + x P(t=1) + x^2 P(t=2) + \cdots$$

(3) Final P(T=n)

k=0  $f(x) = E x^2 = 1 - \sqrt{1-x^2}$  Taylor series & find a familia.